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Abstract
Two parties observing correlated random variables seek to run an interactive communication protocol.
How many bits must they exchange to simulate the protocol, namely to produce a view with a joint
distribution within a fixed statistical distance of the joint distribution of the input and the transcript
of the original protocol? We present an information spectrum approach for this problem whereby the
information complexity of the protocol is replaced by its information complexity density. Our single-
shot bounds relate the communication complexity of simulating a protocol to tail bounds for information
complexity density. As a consequence, we obtain a strong converse and characterize the second-order
asymptotic term in communication complexity for independent and identically distributed observation
sequences. Furthermore, we obtain a general formula for the rate of communication complexity which
applies to any sequence of observations and protocols. Connections with results from theoretical computer
science and implications for the function computation problem are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two parties observing random variables X and Y seek to run an interactive protocol pi with inputs X
and Y . The parties have access to private as well as shared public randomness. What is the minimum
number of bits that they must exchange in order to simulate pi to within a fixed statistical distance ε?
This question is of importance to the theoretical computer science as well as the information theory
communities. On the one hand, it is related closely to the communication complexity problem [53],
which in turn is an important tool for deriving lower bounds for computational complexity [27] and for
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2space complexity of streaming algorithms [2]. On the other hand, it is a significant generalization of
the classical information theoretic problem of distributed data compression [45], replacing data to be
compressed with an interactive protocol and allowing interactive communication as opposed to the usual
one-sided communication.
In recent years, it has been argued that the distributional communication complexity for simulating a
protocol1 pi is related closely to its information complexity2 IC(pi) defined as follows:
IC(pi)
def
= I(Π ∧X|Y ) + I(Π ∧ Y |X),
where I(X∧Y |Z) denotes the conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z (cf. [44], [13]).
For a protocol pi with communication complexity |pi| (the depth of the binary protocol tree), a simulation
protocol requiring O˜(√IC(pi)|pi|) bits of communication was given in [4] and one requiring 2O(IC(pi))
bits of communication was given in [10]. A general version of the simulation problem was considered
in [55], but only bounded round simulation protocols were considered. Interestingly, it was shown in
[8] that the amortized3 distributional communication complexity of simulating n copies of a protocol
pi for vanishing simulation error is bounded above by4 IC(pi). While a matching lower bound was also
derived in [8], it is not valid in our context – [8] considered function computation and used a coordinate-
wise error criterion. Nevertheless, we can readily modify the lower bound argument in [8] and use the
continuity of conditional mutual information to formally obtain the required lower bound and thereby a
characterization of the amortized distributional communication complexity for vanishing simulation error.
Specifically, denoting by D(pin) the distributional communication complexity of simulating n copies of
a protocol pi with vanishing simulation error, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(pin) = IC(pi).
Perhaps motivated by this characterization, or a folklore version of it, the research in this area has focused
on designing simulation protocols for pi requiring communication of length depending on IC(pi); the
results cited above belong to this category as well. However, the central role of IC(pi) in the distributional
communication complexity of protocol simulation is far from settled and many important questions remain
1The difference between simulation and compression of protocols is significant and is discussed in Remark 2 below.
2For brevity, we do not display the dependence of IC(pi) on the (fixed) distribution PXY .
3Throughout the paper, ”amortized” indicates that the observations are independently identically distributed (IID) and the
protocol to be simulated is n copies of the same protocol.
4Braverman and Rao actually used their general simulation protocol as a tool for deriving the amortized distributional
communication complexity of function computation. This result was obtained independently by Ma and Ishwar in [31] using
standard information theoretic techniques.
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3unanswered. For instance, (a) does IC(pi) suffice to capture the dependence of distributional communi-
cation complexity on the simulation error ε? (b) Does information complexity have an operational role
in simulating pin besides being the leading asymptotic term? (c) How about the simulation of more
complicated protocols such as a mixture pimix of two product protocols pin1 and pi
n
2 – does IC(pimix) still
constitute the leading asymptotic term in the communication complexity of simulating pimix?
The quantity IC(pi) plays the same role in the simulation of protocols as H(X) in the compression
of Xn [44] and H(X|Y ) in the transmission of Xn by the first to the second party with access to
Y n [45]. The questions raised above have been addressed for these classical problems (cf. [22]). In this
paper, we answer these questions for simulation of interactive protocols. In particular, we answer all
these questions in the negative by exhibiting another quantity that plays such a fundamental role and
can differ from information complexity significantly. To this end, we introduce the notion of information
complexity density of a protocol pi with inputs X and Y generated from a fixed distribution PXY .
Definition 1 (Information complexity density). The information complexity density of a private coin
protocol pi is given by the function
ic(τ ;x, y) = log
PΠ|XY (τ |x, y)
PΠ|X (τ |x)
+ log
PΠ|XY (τ |x, y)
PΠ|Y (τ |y)
,
for all observations x and y of the two parties and all transcripts τ , where PΠXY denotes the joint
distribution of the observation of the two parties and the random transcript Π generated by pi.
Note that IC(pi) = E [ic(Π;X,Y )]. We show that it is the ε-tail of the information complexity density
ic(Π;X,Y ), i.e., the supremum5 over values of λ such that Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) > ε, which governs
the communication complexity of simulating a protocol with simulation error less than ε and not the
information complexity of the protocol. The information complexity IC(pi) becomes the leading term in
communication complexity for simulating pi only when roughly
IC(pi)
√
Var(ic(Π;X,Y )) log(1/ε).
This condition holds, for instance, in the amortized regime considered in [8]. However, the ε-tail of
ic(Π;X,Y ) can differ significantly from IC(pi), the mean of ic(Π;X,Y ). In Appendix A, we provide
an example protocol with inputs of size 2n such that for ε = 1/n3, the ε-tail of ic(Π;X,Y ) is greater
than 2n while IC(pi) is very small, just O˜(n−2).
5Formally, our lower bound uses lower ε-tail sup{λ : Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) > ε} and the upper bound uses upper ε-tail
inf{λ : Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) < ε}. For many interesting cases, the two coincide.
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
4A. Summary of results
Our main results are bounds for distributional communication complexity Dε (pi) for ε-simulating a
protocol pi. The key quantity in our bounds is the ε-tail λε of ic(Π;X,Y ).
Lower bound. Our main contribution is a general lower bound for Dε (pi). We show that for every
private coin protocol pi, Dε (pi) & λε. In fact, this bound does not rely on the structure of random variable
Π and is valid for the more general problem of simulating a correlated random variable.
Prior to this work, there was no lower bound that captured both the dependence on simulation error ε as
well as the underlying probability distribution. On the one hand, the lower bound above yields many sharp
results in the amortized regime. It gives the leading asymptotic term in the communication complexity
for simulating any sequence of protocols, and not just product protocols. For product protocols, it yields
the precise dependence of communication complexity on ε as well as the exact second-order asymptotic
term. On the other hand, it sheds light on the dependence of Dε (pi) on ε even in the single-shot regime.
For instance, our lower bound can be used to exhibit an arbitrary separation between Dε (pi) and IC(pi)
when ε is not fixed. Specifically, consider the example protocol in Appendix A. On evaluating our lower
bound for this protocol, for ε = 1/n3 we get Dε (pi) = Ω(n) which is far more than 2IC(pi) since
IC(pi) = O˜(n−2). Remarkably, [21], [20] exhibited exponential separation between the distributional
communication complexity of computing a function and the information complexity of that function
even for a fixed ε, thereby establishing the optimality of the upper bound Dε (pi) ≤ O(2IC(pi)) given
in [10]. Our simple example shows a much stronger separation between Dε (pi) and IC(pi), albeit for a
vanishing ε.
Upper bound. To establish our asymptotic results, we propose a new simulation protocol, which is of
independent interest. For a protocol pi with bounded rounds of interaction, using our proposed protocol
we can show that Dε (pi) . λε. Much as the protocol of [8], our simulation protocol simulates one round
at a time, and thus, the slack in our upper bound does depend on the number of rounds.
Note that while the operative term in the lower bound and the upper bound is the ε-tail of ic(Π;X,Y ),
the lower bound approaches it from below and the upper bound approaches it from above. It is often
the case that these two limits match and the leading term in our bounds coincide. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of our bounds.
Amortized regime: second-order asymptotics. Denote by pin the n-fold product protocol obtained by
applying pi to each coordinate (Xi, Yi) for inputs Xn and Y n. Consider the communication complexity
Dε(pi
n) of ε-simulating pin for independent and identically distributed (IID) (Xn, Y n) generated from
PnXY . Using the bounds above, we can obtain the following sharpening of the results of [8]: With V(pi)
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
5Lower bound Upper Bound
Pr(ic(⇧;X,Y )) >  ) < ✏Pr(ic(⇧;X,Y )) >  ) > ✏
Distribution of ic(⇧;X,Y )
Fig. 1: Illustration of lower and upper bounds for Dε (pi)
denoting the variance of ic(Π;X,Y ),
Dε(pi
n) = nIC(pi) +
√
nV(pi)Q−1(ε) + o(
√
n),
where Q(x) is equal to the probability that a standard normal random variable exceeds x and Q−1(ε) ≈√
log(1/ε). On the other hand, the arguments in6 [8] or [55] give us
Dε(pi
n) ≥ nIC(pi)− nε[|pi|+ log |X ||Y|]− ε log(1/ε).
But the precise communication requirement is not less but
√
nV(pi) log(1/ε) more than nIC(pi).
General formula for amortized communication complexity. The lower and upper bounds above
can be used to derive a formula for the first-order asymptotic term, the coefficient of n, in Dε(pin) for
any sequence of protocols pin with inputs Xn ∈ X n and Yn ∈ Yn generated from any sequence of
distributions PXnYn . We illustrate our result by the following example.
Example 1 (Mixed protocol). Consider two protocols pih and pit with inputs X and Y such that IC(pih) >
IC(pit). For n IID observations (Xn, Y n) drawn from PXY , we seek to simulate the mixed protocol pimix,n
defined as follows: Party 1 first flips a (private) coin with probability p of heads and sends the outcome
Π0 to Party 2. Depending on the outcome of the coin, the parties execute pih or pit n times, i.e., they
use pinh if Π0 = h and pi
n
t if Π0 = t. What is the amortized communication complexity of simulating the
mixed protocol pimix,n? Note that
IC(pimix,n) = n [pIC(pih) + (1− p)IC(pit)] .
Is it true that in the manner of [8] the leading asymptotic term in Dε(pimix,n) is IC(pimix,n)? In fact, it is
not so. Our general formula implies that for all p ∈ (0, 1),
Dε(pimix,n) = nIC(pih) + o(n)
6The proof in [8] uses the inequality IC(pi) ≤ |pi|, a multiparty extension of which is available in [15], [32].
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6This is particularly interesting when p is very small and IC(pih) IC(pit).
B. Proof techniques
Proof for the lower bound. We present a new method for deriving lower bounds on distributional
communication complexity. Our proof relies on a reduction argument that utilizes an ε-simulation to
generate an information theoretically secure secret key for X and Y (for a definition of the latter, see
[33], [1] or Section IV). Heuristically, a protocol can be simulated using fewer bits of communication than
its length because of the correlation in X and Y . Due to this correlation, when simulating the protocol,
the parties agree on more bits (generate more common randomness) than what they communicate. These
extra bits can be extracted as an information theoretically secure secret key for the two parties using
the leftover hash lemma (cf. [6], [43]). A lower bound on the number of bits communicated can be
derived using an upper bound for the maximum possible length of a secret key that can be generated
using interactive communication; the latter was derived recently in [50], [51].
Protocol for the upper bound. We simulate a given protocol one round at a time. Simulation of each
round consists of two subroutines: Interactive Slepian-Wolf compression and message reduction by public
randomness. The first subroutine is an interactive version of the classical Slepian-Wolf compression [45]
for sending X to an observer of Y which is of optimal instantaneous rate. The second subroutine uses
an idea that appeared first in [41] (see, also, [35], [54]) and reduces the number of bits communicated in
the first by realizing a portion of the required communication by the shared public randomness. This is
possible since we are not required to recover a given random variable Π, but only simulate it to within
a fixed statistical distance.
The proposed protocol is closely related to that in [8]. However, there are some crucial differences. The
protocol in [8], too, uses public randomness to sample each round of the protocol, before transmitting
it using an interactive communication of size incremented in steps. However, our information theoretic
approach provides a systematic method for choosing this step size. Furthermore, our protocol for sampling
the protocol from public randomness is significantly different from that in [8] and relies on randomness
extraction techniques. In particular, the protocol in [8] does not attain the asymptotically optimal bounds
achieved by our protocol.
Technical approach. While we utilize new, bespoke techniques for deriving our lower and upper
bounds, casting our problem in an information theoretic framework allows us to build upon the develop-
ments in this classic field. In particular, we rely on the information spectrum approach of Han and Verdu´,
introduced in the seminal paper [23] (see the textbook [22] for a detailed account). In this approach, the
classical measures of information such as entropy and mutual information are viewed as expectations
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
7of the corresponding information densities, and the notion of “typical sets” is replaced by sets where
these information densities are bounded uniformly. The distribution of an information density (such as
h(x) = − log PX (x)), or the support of this distribution, is loosely referred to as its spectrum. Further,
we shall refer to the difference between max and min value of h(x) over its support as the length of
the spectrum. Coding theorems of classical information theory consider IID repetitions and rely on the
so-called the asymptotic equipartition property [12] which essentially corresponds to the concentration
of spectrums on small intervals. For single-shot problems such concentrations are not available and we
have to work with the whole span of the spectrum.
Our main technical contribution in this paper is the extension of the information spectrum method to
handle interactive communication. Our results rely on the analysis of appropriately chosen information
densities and, in particular, rely on the spectrum of the information complexity density ic(Π;X,Y ).
Different components of our analysis require bounds on these information densities in different directions,
which in turn renders our bounds loose and incurs a gap equal to the length of the corresponding
information spectrum. To overcome this shortcoming, we use the spectrum slicing technique of Han
[22]7 to divide the information spectrum into small portions with information densities closely bounded
from both sides. While in our upper bounds spectrum slicing is used to carefully choose the parameters
of the protocol, it is required in our lower bounds to identify a set of inputs where a given simulation
will require a large number of bits to be communicated.
C. Organization
A formal statement of the problem along with the necessary preliminaries is given in the next section.
Section III contains all our results. In Section IV, we review the information theoretic secret key agreement
problem, the leftover hash lemma, and the data exchange problem, all of which will be instrumental in
our proofs. The formal proof of our lower bound is contained in Section V and that of our upper bound
in Section VI. Section VII contains a proof of our asymptotic results, followed by concluding remarks
in Section VIII.
D. Notations
Random variables are denoted by capital letters such as X , Y , etc. realizations by small letters such
as x, y, etc. and their range sets by corresponding calligraphic letters such as X , Y , etc.. Protocols are
7The spectrum slicing technique was introduced in [22] to derive the error exponents of various problems for general sources
and a rate-distortion function for general sources.
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8denoted by appropriate subscripts or superscripts with pi, the corresponding random transcripts by the
same sub- or superscripts with Π; τ is used as a placeholder for realizations of random transcripts. All
the logarithms in this paper are to the base 2.
The following convention, described for the entropy density, shall be used for all information densities
used in this paper. We shall abbreviate the entropy density hPX (x) = − log PX (x) by h(x), when there
is no confusion about PX , and the random variable h(X) corresponds to drawing X from the distribution
PX .
Whenever there is no confusion, we will not display the dependence of distributional communication
complexity on the underlying distribution; the latter remains fixed in most of our discussion.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Two parties observe correlated random variables X and Y , with Party 1 observing X and Party
2 observing Y , generated from a fixed distribution PXY and taking values in finite sets X and Y ,
respectively. An interactive protocol pi (for these two parties) consists of shared public randomness U ,
private randomness8 UX and UY , and interactive communication Π1,Π2, ...,Πr. The parties communicate
alternatively with Party 1 transmitting in the odd rounds and Party 2 in the even rounds. Specifically, in
each round i one of the party, say Party 1, communicates and transmits a string of bits Πi ∈ {0, 1}∗ deter-
mined by the previous transmissions Π1, ...,Πi−1 and the observations (X,UX , U) of the communicating
party. To each possible value of the bit string Πi, a state from the state space {C, φ} is associated. If the
next state is C, the other party starts communicating. If it is φ, the protocol stops and each party generates
an output based on its local observation and trascript Π1, ...,Πi of the protocol. We assume without loss
of generality that Party 1 initiates the protocol. Note that the set Ci of possible values of Πi, and the
associated next states C or φ for each value, is determined by a common function of (X,UX , U,Πi−1)
and (Y, UY , U,Πi−1) (cf. [19]), i.e., as a function of a random variable V such that
H(V |X,UX , U,Πi−1) = H(V |Y, UY , U,Πi−1) = 0.
We denote the overall transcript of the protocol by Π. The length of a protocol pi, |pi|, is the maximum
number of bits that are communicated in any execution of the protocol.
In the special case where Ci is a prefix-free set determined by Πi−1, the protocol is called a tree-
protocol (cf. [53], [29]). In this case, the set of transcripts of the protocol can be represented by a
tree, termed the protocol tree, with each leaf corresponding to a particular realization of the transcript.
8The random variables U,UX , UY are mutually independent and independent jointly of (X,Y ).
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9Specifically, the protocol is defined by a binary tree where each internal node v is owned by either party,
and node v is labeled either by a function av : X × UX × U → {0, 1} or bv : Y × UY × U → {0, 1}.
Then each leaf, or the path from the root to the leaf, corresponds to the overall transcript. Our proposed
protocol is indeed a tree protocol. On the other hand, our converse bound applies to the more general
class of interactive protocols described above.
A random variable F is said to be recoverable by pi for Party 1 (or Party 2) if F is function of
(X,U,UX ,Π) (or (Y,U, UY ,Π)).
A protocol with a constant U is called a private coin protocol, with a constant (UX , UY) is called a
public coin protocol, and with (U,UX , UY) constant is called a deterministic protocol. Note that a private
coin protocol can be realized as a public coin protocol by sampling private coins from public coins.
When we execute the protocol pi above, the overall view of the parties consists of random variables
(XYΠΠ), where the two Πs correspond to the transcript of the protocol seen by the two parties. A
simulation of the protocol consists of another protocol which generates almost the same view as that
of the original protocol. We are interested in the simulation of private coin protocols, using arbitrary9
protocols; public coin protocols can be simulated by simulating for each fixed value of public randomness
the resulting private coin protocol.
Definition 2 (ε-Simulation of a protocol). Let pi be a private coin protocol. Given 0 ≤ ε < 1, a protocol
pisim constitutes an ε-simulation of pi if there exist ΠX and ΠY , respectively, recoverable by pisim for
Party 1 and Party 2 such that
dvar (PΠΠXY ,PΠXΠYXY ) ≤ ε, (1)
where dvar (P,Q) = 12
∑
x |Px−Qx| denotes the variational or the statistical distance between P and Q.
Definition 3 (Distributional communication complexity). The ε-error distributional communication
complexity Dε (pi|PXY ) of simulating a private coin protocol pi is the minimum length of an ε-simulation
of pi. The distribution PXY remains fixed throughout our analysis; for brevity, we shall abbreviate
Dε (pi|PXY ) by Dε (pi).
Problem. Given a protocol pi and a joint distribution PXY for the observations of the two parties, we
seek to characterize Dε (pi).
9Since we are not interested in minimizing the amount of shared randomness used in a simulation, we allow arbitrary public
coin protocols to be used as simulation protocols.
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Remark 1 (Deterministic protocols). Note that a deterministic protocol corresponds to an interactive
function. A specific instance of this situation appears in [49] where Π(X,Y ) = (X,Y ) is considered.
For such protocols,
dvar (PΠΠXY ,PΠXΠYXY ) = 1− Pr (Π = ΠX = ΠY) .
Therefore, a protocol is an ε-simulation of a deterministic protocol if and only if it computes the
corresponding interactive function with probability of error less than ε. Furthermore, randomization does
not help in this case, and it suffices to use deterministic simulation protocols. Thus, our results below
provide tight bounds for distributional communication complexity of interactive functions and even of
all functions which are information theoretically securely computable for the distribution PXY , since
computing these functions is tantamount to computing an interactive function [36] (see, also, [5], [28]).
Remark 2 (Compression of protocols). A protocol picom constitutes an ε-compression of a given protocol
pi if it recovers ΠX and ΠY for Party 1 and Party 2 such that
Pr (Π = ΠX = ΠY) ≥ 1− ε.
Note that randomization does not help in this case either. In fact, for deterministic protocols simulation and
compression coincide. In general, however, compression is a more demanding task than simulation and
our results show that in many cases, (such as the amortized regime), compression requires strictly more
communication than simulation. Specifically, our results for ε-simulation in this paper can be modified to
get corresponding results for ε-compression by replacing the information complexity density ic(τ ;x, y)
by
h(τ |x) + h(τ |y) = − log PΠ|X (τ |x) PΠ|Y (τ |y) .
The proofs remain essentially the same and, in fact, simplify significantly.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We derive a lower bound for Dε (pi) which applies to all private coin protocols pi and, in fact, applies
to the more general problem of communication complexity of sampling a correlated random variable. For
protocols with bounded number of rounds of interaction, admittedly a significant restriction, i.e., protocols
with r = r(X,Y, U, UX , UY) ≤ rmax with probability 1, we present a simulation protocol which yields
upper bounds for Dε (pi) of similar form as our lower bounds. In particular, in the asymptotic regime
our bounds improve over previously known bounds and are tight.
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A. Lower bound
We prove the following lower bound.
Theorem 1. Given 0 ≤ ε < 1 and a protocol pi, for arbitrary 0 < η < 1/3
Dε (pi) ≥ sup{λ : Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) ≥ ε+ ε′} − λ′, (2)
where the fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ depend on η as well as appropriately chosen information spectrums
and will be described below in (4) and (5).
The appearance of fudge parameters such as ε′ and λ′ in the bound above is typical since the techniques
to bound the tail probability of random variables invariably entail such parameters, which are tuned based
on the specific scenario being studied. For instance, the Chernoff bound has a parameter that is tuned
with respect to the moment generating function of the random variable of interest. More relevant to
the problem studied here, such fudge parameters also show up in the evalutation of error probability of
single-party non-interactive compression problems (cf. [23], [22]).
When the fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ are negligible, the right-side of the bound above is close to the
ε-tail of ic(Π;X,Y ). Indeed, the fudge parameters turn out to be negligible in many cases of interest.
For instance, for the amortized case ε′ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. The parameter λ′ is related
to the length of the interval in which the underlying information densities lie with probability greater than
1 − ε′, the essential length of spectrums. For the amortized case with product protocols, by the central
limit theorem the related essential spectrums are of length Λ = O(√n) and λ′ = log Λ. On the other
hand, λε is O(n). Thus, the log n order fudge parameter λ′ is negligible in this case. The same is true
also for the example protocol in Appendix A. Finally, it should be noted that similar fudge parameters
are ubiquitous in single-shot bounds; for instance, see [22, Lemma 1.3.2].
Remark 3. The result above does not rely on the interactive nature of Π and is valid for simulation of
any random variable Π. Specifically, for any joint distribution PΠXY , an ε-simulation satisfying (1) must
communicate at least as many bits as the right-side of (2), which is roughly equal to the largest value
λε of λ such that Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) > ε.
The fudge parameters. The fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ in Theorem 1 depend on the spectrums of
the following information densities:
(i) Information complexity density: This density is described in Definition 1 and will play a pivotal
role in our results.
(ii) Entropy density of (X,Y ): This density, given by h(X,Y ) = − log PXY (X,Y ), captures the
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
12
randomness in the data and plays a fundamental role in the compression of the collective data of
the two parties (cf. [22]).
(iii) Conditional entropy density of X given YΠ: The conditional entropy density h(X|Y ) = − log PX|Y (X|Y )
plays a fundamental role in the compression of X for an observer of Y [34], [22]. We shall use
the conditional entropy density h(X|YΠ) in our bounds.
(iv) Sum conditional entropy density of (XΠ, YΠ): The sum conditional entropy density is given by
h (X4Y ) = − log PX|Y (X|Y ) PY |X (Y |X) has been shown recently to play a fundamental role in
the communication complexity of the data exchange problem [49]. We shall use the sum conditional
entropy density h (XΠ4YΠ).
(v) Information density of X and Y is given by i(X ∧ Y ) def= h(X)− h(X|Y ).
Let [λ(1)min, λ
(1)
max], [λ
(2)
min, λ
(2)
max], and [λ
(3)
min, λ
(3)
max] denote the “essential” spectrums of information densities
ζ1 = h(X,Y ), ζ2 = h(X|YΠ), and ζ3 = h (XΠ4YΠ), respectively. Concretely, let the tail events
Ei = {ζi /∈ [λ(i)min, λ(i)max]}, i = 1, 2, 3, satisfy
Pr (E1) + Pr (E2) + Pr (E3) ≤ εtail, (3)
where εtail can be chosen to be appropriately small. Further, let Λi = λ
(i)
max − λ(i)min, i = 1, 2, 3, denote
the corresponding effective spectrum lengths. The parameters ε′ and λ′ in Theorem 1 are given by
ε′ = εtail + 2η (4)
and
λ′ = 2 log Λ1Λ3 + log Λ2 − log(1− 3η) + 9 log 1/η + 3, (5)
where 0 < η < 1/3 is arbitrary. If Λi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, we can replace it with 1 in the bound above.
Thus, our spectrum slicing approach allows us to reduce the dependence of λ′ on spectrum lengths Λi’s
from linear to logarithmic.
B. Upper bound
We prove the following upper bound.
Theorem 2. For every 0 ≤ ε < 1 and every protocol pi,
Dε (pi) ≤ inf
{
λ : Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) ≤ ε− ε′}+ λ′,
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where the fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ depend on the maximum number of rounds of interaction in pi and
on appropriately chosen information spectrums.
Remark 4. In contrast to the lower bound given in the previous section, the upper bound above relies
on the interactive nature of pi. Furthermore, the fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ depend on the number of
rounds, and the upper bound may not be useful when the number of rounds is not negligible compared
to the ε-tail of the information complexity density. However, we will see that the above upper bound is
tight for the amortized regime, even up to the second-order asymptotic term.
The simulation protocol. Our simulation protocol simulates the given protocol pi round-by-round,
starting from Π1 to Πr. Simulation of each round consists of two subroutines: Interactive Slepian-Wolf
compression and message reduction by public randomness.
The first subroutine uses an interactive version of the classical Slepian-Wolf compression [45] (see [34]
for a single-shot version) for sending X to an observer of Y . The standard (noninteractive) Slepian-Wolf
coding entails hashing X to l values and sending the hash values to the observer of Y . The number of
hash values l is chosen to take into account the worst-case performance of the protocol. However, we
are not interested in the worst-case performance of each round, but of the overall multiround protocol.
As such, we seek to compress X using the least possible instantaneous rate. To that end, we increase the
number of hash values gradually, ∆ at a time, until the receiver decodes X and sends back an ACK. We
apply this subroutine to each round i, say i odd, with Πi in the role of X and (Y,Π1....,Πi−1) in the role
of Y . Similar interactive Slepian-Wolf compression schemes have been considered earlier in different
contexts (cf. [17], [38], [52], [25], [49]).
The second subroutine reduces the number of bits communicated in the first by realizing a portion
of the required communication by the shared public randomness U . Specifically, instead of transmitting
hash values of Πi, we transmit hash values of a random variable Πˆi generated in such a manner that some
of its corresponding hash bits can be extracted from U and the overall joint distributions do not change
by much. Since U is independent of (X,Y ), the number k of hash bits that can be realized using public
randomness is the maximum number of random hash bits of Πi that can be made almost independent of
(X,Y ), a good bound for which is given by the leftover hash lemma. The overall simulation protocol
for Πi now communicates l − k instead of l bits. A similar technique for message reduction appears in
a different context in [41], [35], [54].
The overall performance of the protocol above is still suboptimal because the saving of k bits is limited
by the worst-case performance. To remedy this shortcoming, we once again take recourse to spectrum
slicing to ensure that our saving k is close to the best possible for each realization (Π, X, Y ).
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Note that our protocol above is closely related to that proposed in [8]. However, the information
theoretic form here makes it amenable to techniques such as spectrum slicing, which leads to tighter
bounds than those established in [8].
The fudge parameters. The fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ in Theorem 2 depend on the spectrum of
various conditional information densities. To optimize the performance of each subroutine described
above, we slice the spectrum of the respective conditional information density involved. Specifically,
for odd round t, we slice the spectrum of h(Πt|YΠt−1) = − log PΠt|YΠt−1
(
Πt|Y,Πt−1
)
for interactive
Slepian-Wolf compression and h(Πt|XΠt−1) = − log PΠt|XΠt−1
(
Πt|X,Πt−1
)
for the substitution of
message by public randomness; for even rounds, the role of X and Y is interchanged. Each round
involves some residuals related to the two conditional information densities. The fudge parameters ε′ and
λ′ are accumulations of the residuals of each round. The explicit expressions for ε′ and λ′ are rather
technical and are given in Section VI-E along with the proofs.
C. Amortized regime: second-order asymptotics
It was shown in [8] that information complexity of a protocol equals the amortized communication
rate for simulating the protocol, i.e.,
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
Dε(pi
n|PnXY ) = IC(pi),
where PnXY denotes the n-fold product of the distribution PXY , namely the distribution of random
variables (Xi, Yi)ni=1 drawn IID from PXY , and pi
n corresponds to running the same protocol pi on every
coordinate (Xi, Yi). Thus, IC(pi) is the first-order term (coefficient of n) in the communication complexity
of simulating the n-fold product of the protocol. However, the analysis in [8] sheds no light on finer
asymptotics such as the second-order term or the dependence of Dε(pin|PnXY ) on10 ε. On the one hand,
it even remains unclear from [8] if a positive ε reduces the amortized communication rate or not. On the
other hand, the amortized communication rate yields only a loose bound for Dε(pin|PnXY ) for a finite,
fixed n. A better estimate of Dε(pin|PnXY ) at a finite n and for a fixed ε can be obtained by identifying
the second-order asymptotic term. Such second-order asymptotics were first considered in [46] and have
received a lot of attention in information theory in recent years following [24], [39].
Our lower bound in Theorem 1 and upper bound in Theorem 2 show that the leading term in
Dε(pi
n|PnXY ) is roughly the ε-tail λε of the random variable ic(Πn;Xn, Y n) =
∑n
i=1 ic(Πi;Xi, Yi), a
sum of n IID random variables. By the central limit theorem the first-order asymptotic term in λε equals
10The lower bound in [8] gives only the weak converse which holds only when ε = εn → 0 as n→∞.
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nE [ic(Π;X,Y )] = nIC(pi), recovering the result of [8]. Furthermore, the second-order asymptotic term
depends on the variance V(pi) of ic(Π;X,Y ), i.e., on
V(pi)
def
= Var [ic(Π;X,Y )] .
We have the following result.
Theorem 3. For every 0 < ε < 1 and every protocol pi with V(pi) > 0,
Dε(pi
n|PnXY ) = nIC(pi) +
√
nV(pi)Q−1(ε) + o(
√
n),
where Q(x) is equal to the probability that a standard normal random variable exceeds x.
As a corollary, we obtain the strong converse.
Corollary 4. For every 0 < ε < 1, the amortized communication rate
lim
n→∞
1
n
Dε(pi
n|PnXY ) = IC(pi).
Corollary 4 implies that the amortized communication complexity of simulating protocol pi cannot
be smaller than its information complexity even if we allow a positive error. Thus, if the length of the
simulation protocol pisim is “much smaller” than nIC(pi), the corresponding simulation error ε = εn must
approach 1. But how fast does this εn converge to 1? Our next result shows that this convergence is
exponentially rapid in n.
Theorem 5. Given a protocol pi and an arbitrary δ > 0, for any simulation protocol pisim with
|pisim| ≤ n[IC(pi)− δ],
there exists a constant E = E(δ) > 0 such that for every n sufficiently large, it holds that
dvar
(
PΠnΠnXnY n ,PΠnXΠnYXnY n
) ≥ 1− 2−En.
A similar converse was first shown for the channel coding problem by Arimoto [3] (see [16], [40] for
further refinements of this result), and has been studied for other classical information theory problems
as well. To the best of our knowledge, Corollary 5 is the first instance of an Arimoto converse for a
problem involving interactive communication.
In the theoretical computer science literature, such converse results have been termed direct product
theorems and have been considered in the context of the (distributional) communication complexity
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problem (for computing a given function) [9], [11], [26]. Our lower bound in Theorem 1, too, yields
a direct product theorem for the communication complexity problem. We state this simple result in the
passing, skipping the details since they closely mimic Theorem 5. Specifically, given a function f on
X ×Y , by a slight abuse of notations and terminologies, let Dε(f) = Dε(f |PXY ) be the communication
complexity of computing f . As noted in Remark 3, Theorem 1 is valid for an arbitrary random variables
Π, and not just an interactive protocol. Then, by following the proof of Theorem 5 with F = f(X,Y )
replacing Π in the application of Theorem 1, we get the following direct product theorem.
Theorem 6. Given a function f and an arbitrary δ > 0, for any function computation protocol pi
computing estimates FX ,n and FY,n of fn at the Party 1 and Party 2, respectively, and with length
|pi| ≤ n[H(F |X) +H(F |Y )− δ], (6)
there exists a constant E = E(δ) > 0 such that for every n sufficiently large, it holds that
Pr (FX ,n = FY,n = Fn) ≤ 2−En,
where Fn := (F1, ..., Fn) and Fi := f(Xi, Yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Recall that [8], [31] showed that the first order asymptotic term in the amortized communication
complexity for function computation equals the information complexity IC(f) of the function, namely
the infimum over IC(pi) for all interactive protocols pi that recover f with 0 error. Ideally, we would like
to show an Arimoto converse for this problem, i.e., replace the threshold on the right-side of (6) with
n[IC(f)− δ]. The direct product result above is weaker than such an Arimoto converse, and proving the
Arimoto converse for the function computation problem is work in progress. Nevertheless, the simple
result above is not comparable with the known direct product theorems in [9], [11] and can be stronger
in some regimes11.
D. General formula for amortized communication complexity
Consider arbitrary distributions PXnYn on X n×Yn and arbitrary protocols pin with inputs Xn and Yn
taking values in X n and Yn, for each n ∈ N. For vanishing simulation error εn, how does Dεn(pin|PXnYn)
evolve as a function of n?
The previous section, and much of the theoretical computer science literature, has focused on the
case when PXnYn = P
n
XY and the same protocol pi is executed on each coordinate. In this section,
11The result in [9], [11] shows a direct product theorem when we communicate less than nIC(f)/poly(logn).
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we identify the first-order asymptotic term in Dεn(pin|PXnYn) for a general sequence of distributions12
{PXnYn}∞n=1 and a general sequence of protocols pi = {pin}∞n=1. Formally, the amortized (distributional)
communication complexity of pi for {PXnYn}∞n=1 is given by13
D(pi)
def
= lim
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
Dε(pin|PXnYn).
Our goal is to characterize D(pi) for any given sequences Pn and pi. We seek a general formula for
D(pi) under minimal assumptions. Since we do not make any assumptions on the underlying distribution,
we cannot use any measure concentration results. Instead, we take recourse to probability limits of infor-
mation spectrums introduced by Han and Verdu´ in [23] for handling this situation (cf. [22]). Specifically,
for a sequence of protocols pi = {pin}∞n=1 and a sequence of observations (X,Y) = {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=1, the
sup information complexity is defined as
IC(pi)
def
= inf
{
α | lim
n→∞Pr
(
1
n
ic(Πn;Xn, Yn) > α
)
= 0
}
,
where, with a slight abuse of notation, Πn is the transcript of protocol pin for observations (Xn, Yn). The
result below shows that it is nIC(pi), and not IC(pin), that determines the communication complexity in
general.
Theorem 7. For every sequence of protocols pi = {pin}∞n=1,
D(pi) = IC(pi).
The proof uses Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 with carefully chosen spectrum-slice sizes.
For the case when pin = pin and PXnYn = P
n
XY , it follows from the law of large numbers that
IC(pi) = IC(pi) and we recover the result of [8]. However, the utility of the general formula goes beyond
this simple amortized regime. Example 1 provides one such instance. In this case, IC(pi) can be easily
shown to equal IC(pih) for any bias of the coin Π0.
IV. BACKGROUND: SECRET KEY AGREEMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE
Our proofs draw from various techniques in cryptography and information theory. In particular, we use
our recent results on information theoretic secret key agreement and data exchange, which are reviewed
in this section together with the requisite background.
12We do not require PXnYn to be even consistent.
13Although D(pi) also depends on {PXnYn}∞n=1, we omit the dependency in our notation.
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A. Secret key agreement by public discussion
The problem of two party secret key agreement by public discussion was alluded to in [7], but a
proper formulation and an asymptotically optimal construction appeared first in [33], [1]. Consider two
parties with the first and the second party, respectively, observing the random variable X and Y . Using
an interactive protocol pi and their local observations, the parties agree on a secret key. A random variable
K constitutes a secret key if the two parties form estimates that agree with K with probability close to 1
and K is concealed, in effect, from an eavesdropper with access to the transcript Π and a side-information
Z. Formally, let KX and KY , respectively, be recoverable by pi for the first and the second party. Such
random variables KX and KY with common range K constitute an ε-secret key if the following condition
is satisfied:
dvar
(
PKXKYΠZ ,P
(2)
unif × PΠZ
)
≤ ε,
where
P
(2)
unif (kX , kY) =
1(kX = kY)
|K| .
The condition above ensures both reliable recovery, requiring Pr (KX 6= KY) to be small, and information
theoretic secrecy, requiring the distribution of KX (or KY ) to be almost independent of the eavesdropper’s
side information (Π, Z) and to be almost uniform. See [50] for a discussion.
Definition 4. Given 0 ≤ ε < 1, the supremum over lengths log |K| of an ε-secret key is denoted by
Sε(X,Y |Z), and for the case when Z is constant by Sε(X,Y ).
By its definition, Sε(X,Y |Z) has the following monotonicity property.
Lemma 8 (Monotonicity). For any deterministic protocol pi,
Sε(X,Y |Z) ≥ Sε(XΠ, YΠ|ZΠ).
Furthermore, if VX and VY can be recovered by pi for the first and the second party, respectively, then
Sε(X,Y |Z) ≥ Sε(XVX , VY |ZΠ).
The claim holds since the two parties can generate a secret key by first running pi and then generating
a secret key for the case when the first party observes (X,Π), the second party observes (Y,Π) and
the eavesdropper observes (Z,Π). Similarly, the second inequality holds since the parties can ignore a
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portion of their observations and generate a secret key from (X,VX ) and (Y, VY).
1) Leftover hash lemma: A key tool for generating secret keys is the leftover hash lemma (cf. [42])
which, given a random variable X and an l-bit eavesdropper’s observation Z, allows us to extract roughly
Hmin(PX)− l bits of uniform bits, independent of Z. We shall use a slightly more general form. Given
random variables X and Z, let
Hmin (PXZ | QZ) def= sup
x,z
− log PXZ (x, z)
QZ (z)
.
We define the conditional min-entropy of X given Z as
Hmin (PXZ | Z) def= sup
QZ : supp(PZ)⊂ supp(QZ)
Hmin (PXZ | QZ) .
Further, let F be a 2-universal family of mappings f : X → K, i.e., for each x′ 6= x, the family F
satisfies
1
|F|
∑
f∈F
1(f(x) = f(x′)) ≤ 1|K| .
Lemma 9 (Leftover Hash). Consider random variables X,Z and V taking values in countable sets X ,
Z , and a finite set V , respectively. Let S be a random seed such that fS is uniformly distributed over a
2-universal family F . Then, for KS = fS(X)
ES {dvar (PKSV Z ,PunifPV Z)} ≤
1
2
√
|K||V|2−Hmin(PXZ |Z),
where Punif is the uniform distribution on K.
The version above is a straightforward modification of the leftover hash lemma in, for instance, [42]
and can be derived in a similar manner.
As an application of the leftover hash lemma above, we get the following useful result.
Lemma 10. Consider random variables X,Y, Z and V taking values in countable sets X , Y , Z , and a
finite set V , respectively. Then,
S2ε(X,Y |ZV ) ≥ Sε(X,Y |Z)− log |V| − 2 log(1/2ε).
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
2) Conditional independence testing upper bound for secret key lengths: Next, we recall the conditional
independence testing upper bound for Sε(X,Y ), which was established in [50], [51]. In fact, the general
upper bound in [50], [51] is a single-shot upper bound on the secret key length for a multiparty secret
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key agreement problem with side information at the eavesdropper. Below, we recall a specialization of
the general result for the two party case with no side information at the eavesdropper. In order to state
the result, we need the following concept from binary hypothesis testing.
Consider a binary hypothesis testing problem with null hypothesis P and alternative hypothesis Q,
where P and Q are distributions on the same alphabet V . Upon observing a value v ∈ V , the observer
needs to decide if the value was generated by the distribution P or the distribution Q. To this end, the
observer applies a stochastic test T, which is a conditional distribution on {0, 1} given an observation
v ∈ V . When v ∈ V is observed, the test T chooses the null hypothesis with probability T(0|v) and the
alternative hypothesis with probability T (1|v) = 1 − T (0|v). For 0 ≤ ε < 1, denote by βε(P,Q) the
infimum of the probability of error of type II given that the probability of error of type I is less than ε,
i.e.,
βε(P,Q) := inf
T : P[T]≥1−ε
Q[T],
where
P[T] =
∑
v
P(v)T(0|v),
Q[T] =
∑
v
Q(v)T(0|v).
The following upper bound for Sε(X,Y ) was established in [50], [51].
Theorem 11 (Conditional independence testing bound). Given 0 ≤ ε < 1, 0 < η < 1−ε, the following
bound holds:
Sε (X,Y ) ≤ − log βε+η
(
PXY ,QXQY
)
+ 2 log(1/η),
for all distributions QX and QY on X and Y , respectively.
We close by noting a further upper bound for βε(P,Q), which is easy to derive.
Lemma 12. For every 0 ≤ ε < 1 and λ,
− log βε(P,Q) ≤ λ− log
(
P
(
log
P (X)
Q (X)
< λ
)
− ε
)
+
,
where (x)+ = max{0, x}. As a corollary, we obtain the following upper bound for Sε(X,Y ):
Sε (X,Y ) ≤ λ− log
(
Pr
(
log
PXY (X,Y )
QX (X) QY (Y )
< λ
)
− ε− η
)
+
+ 2 log(1/η),
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for all distributions QX and QY .
B. The data exchange problem
The next primitive that will be used in the reduction argument in our lower bound proof is a protocol
for data exchange. The parties observing X and Y seek to know each other’s data. What is the minimum
length of interactive communication required? This basic problem, first studied in [37], is in effect a
two-party extension of the classical Slepian-Wolf compression [45] (see [14] for a multiparty version).
In a recent work [49], we derived tight lower and upper bounds for the length of a protocol that, for a
given distribution PXY , will facilitate data exchange with probability of error less than ε. We review the
proposed protocol and its performance here; first, we formally define the data exchange problem.
Definition 5. For 0 ≤ ε < 1, a protocol pi attains ε-data exchange if there exist Yˆ and Xˆ which are
recoverable by pi for the first and the second party, respectively, and satisfy
P(Xˆ = X, Yˆ = Y ) ≥ 1− ε.
Note that data exchange corresponds to simulating a (deterministic) interactive protocol pi where
Π1(X) = X and Π2 = Y ; attaining ε-data exchange is tantamount to ε-simulation of pi. In fact, the
specific protocol for data exchange proposed in [49] can be recovered as a special case of our simulation
protocol in Section VI. The next result paraphrases [49, Theorem 2] and can also be recovered as a
special case of Lemma 21.
We paraphrase the result form [49] in a form that is more suited for our application here. The
data exchange protocol proposed in [49] relies on slicing the spectrum of h(X|Y ) (or h(Y |X)). Let
Etail denote the tail event h(X|Y ) /∈ [λ′min, λ′max]. The protocol entails slicing the essential spectrum
[λ′min, λ
′
max] into N parts of length ∆ each, i.e.,
N =
λ′max − λ′min
∆
.
Theorem 13 ([49, Theorem 2], Lemma 21). Given ∆ > 0, ξ > 0, and N as above, there exists a
deterministic protocol for ε-data exchange satisfying the following properties:
(i) Denoting by Eerror the error event, it holds that
PXY (Eerror ∩ {h(X4Y ) ≤ λ}) ≤ PXY (Etail) +N2−ξ,
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which further yields that the probability of error ε is bounded above as
ε ≤ PXY (h(X4Y ) > λ) + PXY (Etail) +N2−ξ;
(ii) the protocol communicates no more than λ+ ∆ +N + ξ bits;
(iii) for every (X,Y ) such that λ′min < h(X|Y ) < λ′max, the transcript of the protocol can take no more
than 2h(X4Y )+∆+ξ values.
Note that property (iii) above, though not explicitly stated in [49, Theorem 2] or in the general
Lemma 21 below, follows simply from the proofs of these results. It makes the subtle observation that
while, for each (X,Y ) such that λ′min < h(X|Y ) < λ′max, h (X4Y )+∆+N+ξ bits are communicated
to interactively generate the transcript, the number of (variable length) transcripts is no more than14
h (X4Y ) + ∆ + N + ξ. Property (ii) above was crucial to establish the communication complexity
results of [49]; property (iii) was not relevant in the context of that work. On the other hand, here we
shall use the protocol of Theorem 13 in our reduction to secret key agreement in the next section and will
treat the communication used in data exchange as eavesdropper’s side information. As such, it suffices
to bound the number of values taken by the transcript; the number of bits actually communicated in the
interactive protocol is a loose upper bound on the former quantity.
Interestingly, our simulation protocol given in Section VI is used both in our upper bound to compress
a given protocol and in our lower bound to complete the reduction argument.
V. PROOF OF LOWER BOUND
As described in the introduction, our proof of Theorem 1 relies on generating a secret key for X and Y
from a given ε-simulation pisim of pi. However, there are two caveats in the heuristic approach described
in the introduction:
First, to extract secret keys from the generated common randomness we rely on the leftover hash lemma.
In particular, the bits are extracted by applying a 2-universal hash family to the common randomness
generated. However, the range-size of the hash family must be selected based on the min-entropy of the
generated common randomness, which is not easy to estimate. To remedy this, we communicate more
using a data-exchange protocol proposed in [49] to make the collective observations (X,Y ) available
to both the parties; a good bound for the communication complexity of this protocol is available. The
generated common randomness now includes (X,Y ) for which the min-entropy can be easily bounded
14The N -bit ACK-NACK feedback used in the protocol can be determined from the length of the transcript.
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and the size of the aforementioned extracted secret key can be tracked. A similar common randomness
completion and decomposition technique was introduced in [48] to characterize a class of securely
computable functions.
Second, our methodology described above requires bounds on various information densities in different
directions. A direct application of this method will result in a gap equal to the effective length of various
spectrums involved. To remedy this, we apply the methodology described above not to the original
distribution PXY but a conditional distribution PXY |E where the event E is an appropriately chosen
event contained in single slices of various spectrums involved. Such a conditioning is allowed since we
are interested in the worst-case communication complexity of the simulation protocol.
We now describe the proof of Theorem 1 in detail. To make the exposition clear, we have divided the
proof into five steps.
Given a (private coin) protocol pi, let pisim be its ε-simulation and ΠX and ΠY be the corresponding
estimates of the transcript Π for Party 1 and Party 2, respectively.
A. From simulation to probability of error
We first use a coupling argument to replace the ε-simulation condition with an ε probability of error
condition. Recall the maximal coupling lemma.
Lemma 14 (Maximal Coupling Lemma [47]). For any two distributions P and Q on the same set,
there exists a joint distribution PXY with X ∼ P and Y ∼ Q such that
Pr (X 6= Y ) = dvar (P,Q) .
Using the maximal coupling lemma, for each fixed x, y there exists a joint distribution PΠΠXΠY |X=x,Y=y
such that
Pr (Π = ΠX = ΠY |X = x, Y = y) = 1− dvar
(
PΠΠ|X=x,Y=y,PΠXΠY |X=x,Y=y
)
;
Consequently,
Pr (Π = ΠX = ΠY) = 1−
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) dvar
(
PΠΠ|X=x,Y=y,PΠXΠY |X=x,Y=y
)
= 1− dvar (PΠΠXY ,PΠXΠYXY )
≥ 1− ε. (7)
As pointed in footnote 9, we restrict ourselves to public coin protocols pisim using shared public random-
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ness U . For concreteness (and convenience of proof), we define the joint distribution for (ΠΠXΠYXY U)
as
PΠXΠYΠXY U = PΠXΠYΠXY PU |ΠXΠYXY . (8)
Note that the marginal PΠXΠYXY U remains as in the original protocol. In particular, (X,Y ) is jointly
independent of U .
B. From partial knowledge to omniscience
As explained in the heuristic proof above, instead of extracting a secret key from the common
randomness generated by the protocol pisim, we first use the data exchange protocol of Theorem 13
to make all the data available to both the parties, which was termed attaining omniscience15 in [14].
In particular, the parties run the protocol pisim followed by a data exchange protocol for (XΠ, YΠ) to
recover (X,Y ) at both the parties. Once both the parties have access to (X,Y ), they can extract a secret
key from (X,Y ) which will be used in the reduction in our final step.
Formally, with the notations introduced in Section IV-B, let piDE be the data exchange protocol of
Theorem 13 with X and Y replaced by (XΠ) and (YΠ), respectively, with N2 and ∆2 denoting N and
∆, respectively, and with λ = λ(3)max, λ′min = λ
(2)
min, λ
′
max = λ
(2)
max. Then, denoting by Eerror the error
event for the protocol piDE Theorem 13(i) yields
Pr (Eerror ∩ Ec3) ≤ Pr (E2) +N22−ξ, (9)
where E2 and E3 are as in (3). Furthermore, for every realization (X,Y ) /∈ E3 the number possible
transcripts ΠDE is no more than
2h(XΠ4YΠ)+∆2+ξ. (10)
We seek to use piDE for recovering Y and X , respectively, at Party 1 and Party 2 by running piDE
successively after pisim. However, pisim yields XΠX and YΠY at Party 1 and Party 2, respectively, while
the data exchange protocol piDE facilitates data exchange when the two parties observe XΠ and YΠ. We
can easily fix this gap using (7).
Specifically, denote by Xˆ and Yˆ the estimates of X and Y formed at Party 2 and Party 1 in piDE. Note
15Csisza´r and Narayan considered a multiterminal version of the data exchange problem in [14] and connected the minimum
(amortized) rate of communication needed to the maximum (amortized) secret key rate.
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that piDE is a deterministic protocol and Xˆ and Yˆ are functions of (X,Y,Π,Π). Denote by A the set
A = {(τX , τY , τ, x, y) : τX = τY = τ}
and by B the set
B = {(τX , τY , τ, x, y) : Xˆ(x, y, τ, τ) = x, Yˆ (x, y, τ, τ) = y},
which is the same as Ecerror for Eerror in (9). Then, by (7) and (9)
Pr
(
{Xˆ(X,Y,ΠX ,ΠY) = X, Yˆ (X,Y,ΠX ,ΠY) = Y } ∩ Ec3
)
≥ PΠXΠYΠXY (A ∩ B ∩ Ec3)
≥ PΠXΠYΠXY (A) + Pr (Ec3)− PΠXΠYΠXY (Bc ∩ Ec3)− 1
≥ 1− ε− Pr (E2)− Pr (E3)−N22−ξ. (11)
C. From simulation to secret keys: A rough sketch of the reduction
The first step in our proof is to replace the simulation condition (1) with the probability of error
condition (7) for the joint distribution PΠXΠYΠXY U in (8).
Next, we “complete the common randomness,” i.e., we communicate more to facilitate the recovery
of Y and X at Party 1 and Party 2, respectively. To that end, upon executing pisim, the parties run the
data exchange protocol piDE of Theorem 13 for (XΠ) and (YΠ), with (X,ΠX ) and (Y,ΠY) in place of
(XΠ) and (YΠ), respectively. Condition (7) guarantees that the combined protocol (pisim, piDE) recovers
Y and X at Party 1 and Party 2 with probability of error less than ε.
We now sketch our reduction argument. Consider the secret key agreement for X and Y when the
eavesdropper observes U . By the independence of (X,Y ) and U , Sη(XU, Y U |U) = Sη(X,Y ), and
further, the result of [50] shows that Sη(X,Y ) is bounded above, roughly, by the mutual information
density i(X ∧ Y ) = log PXY (X,Y ) /PX (X) PY (Y ), i.e.,
Sη(XU, Y U |U) = Sη(X,Y ) . i(X ∧ Y ). (12)
On the other hand, we can generate a secret key using the following protocol:
1) Run the combined protocol (pisim, piDE) to attain data exchange for X and Y , resulting in a common
randomness of size roughly h(X,Y |U) = h(X,Y ).
2) The data exchange protocol piDE for (XΠ) and (YΠ) communicates roughly h (XΠ4YΠ) bits for
every fixed realization (X,Y,Π). Thus, the combined protocol (pisim, piDE), which allows both the
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parties to recover (X,Y ), communicates no more than |pisim|+ h (XΠ4YΠ) bits for every fixed
realization (X,Y,Π). Using the leftover hash lemma, we can extract a secret key of rate roughly
h(X,Y )− |pisim| − h (XΠ4YΠ).
The following approximate inequalities summarize our reduction:
Sη(XU, Y U |U) ≥ Sη(XYˆ , XˆY |ΠsimΠDEU)
& Sη(XYˆ , XˆY |U)− |pisim| − h (XΠ4YΠ)
≈ h(X,Y )− |pisim| − h (XΠ4YΠ) , (13)
where the first inequality is by Lemma 8 and the the second by Lemma 9.
We note that the generation of secret keys from data exchange was first proposed in [14] in an amortized,
IID setup and was shown to yield a secret key of asymptotically optimal rate.
From (12) and (13) it follows that
|pisim| & h(X,Y )− h (XΠ4YΠ)− i(X ∧ Y ) = ic(Π;X,Y ),
which is the required lower bound.
Clearly, the steps above are not precise. We have used instantaneous communication and common ran-
domness lengths in our bounds whereas a formal treatment will require us to use worst-case performance
bounds for these quantities. Unfortunately, such worst-case bounds do not yield our desired lower bound
for Dε (pi). To fill this gap, we apply the arguments above not for the original distribution PΠXΠYΠXY U
but for the conditional distribution PΠXΠYΠXY U |E where the event E is carefully constructed in such a
manner that the aforementioned worst-case bounds are close to instantaneous bounds for all realizations.
Specifically, E is selected by appropriately slicing the spectrums of the various information densities that
appear in the worst-case bounds.
D. From original to conditional probabilities: A Spectrum slicing argument
To identify an appropriate critical event for conditioning, we take recourse to spectrum slicing. Specif-
ically, we identify an appropriate subset of intersection of slices of spectrums (ii) and (iv) described in
Section III-A. For the combined protocol (pisim, piDE) and the estimates (Xˆ, Yˆ ) as above, and λ
(i)
min, λ
(i)
max,
i = 1, 2, 3, as in Section III-A, let
Esim = {Π = ΠX = ΠY},
EDE = {Xˆ(X,Y,ΠX ,ΠY) = X, Yˆ (X,Y,ΠX ,ΠY) = Y },
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Eλ = {ic(Π;X,Y ) ≥ λ}
E(1)i = {λ(1)min + (i− 1)∆1 ≤ h(X,Y ) ≤ λ(1)min + i∆1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N1,
E(3)j = {λ(3)min + (j − 1)∆3 ≤ h (XΠ4YΠ) ≤ λ(3)min + j∆3}, 1 ≤ j ≤ N3,
where
N1 =
λ
(1)
max − λ(1)min
∆1
and N3 =
λ
(3)
max − λ(3)min
∆3
.
Note that ∪i E(1)i = Ec1 and ∪j E(3)j = Ec3 , where the events E1 and E3 are as in (3). Finally, define the
event Eij as follows:
Eij = Esim ∩ EDE ∩ Eλ ∩ E(1)i ∩ E(3)j , 1 ≤ i ≤ N1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N3.
The next lemma says that (at least) one of the events Eij has significant probability, and this particular
event will be used as the critical event in our proofs.
Lemma 15. There exists i, j such that
Pr (Eij) ≥ Pr (Eλ)− ε− εtail −N22
−ξ
N1N3
def
= α. (14)
Proof. Note that the event Esim ∩ EDE ∩ Ec3 is the same as the event A ∩ B ∩ Ec3 of (11). Therefore,
Pr (Esim ∩ EDE ∩ Eλ ∩ Ec1 ∩ Ec3) ≥ Pr (Eλ) + Pr (Esim ∩ EDE ∩ Ec3) + Pr (Ec1)− 2
≥ Pr (Eλ)− ε− Pr (E2)− Pr (E3)−N22−ξ − Pr (E1)
≥ Pr (Eλ)− ε− εtail −N22−ξ,
where the second inequality uses (11) and and the third uses (3). The proof is completed upon noting
that {Eij}i,j constitutes a partition of Esim ∩ EDE ∩ Eλ ∩ Ec1 ∩ Ec3 with N1N3 parts. 
E. From simulation to secret keys: The formal reduction proof
We are now in a position to complete the proof of our lower bound. For brevity, let E denote the event
Eij of Lemma 15 satisfying Pr (E) ≥ α.
Our proof essentially formalizes the steps outlined in Section V-C, but for the conditional distribution
given E . With an abuse of notation, let Sη(X,Y |Z, E) denote the maximum length of an η-secret key
for two parties observing X and Y , and the eavesdropper’s side information Z, when the distribution
of (X,Y, Z) is given by PXY Z|E . Then, using Lemma 12 with QX = PX and QY = PY , we get the
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following bound in place of (12):
S2η(X,Y |E) ≤ γ − log
(
Pr
({
(x, y) : log
PXY |E (x, y)
PX (x) PY (y)
< γ
} ∣∣∣∣ E)− 3η)
+
+ 2 log(1/η)
≤ γ − log
(
Pr
({
(x, y) : log
PXY (x, y)
PX (x) PY (y)
< γ + logα
} ∣∣∣∣ E)− 3η)
+
+ 2 log(1/η),
(15)
where 0 < η < 1/3 is arbitrary and in the previous inequality we have used
PXY |E (x, y|E) ≤
PXY (x, y)
Pr (E) ≤
PXY (x, y)
α
.
To replace (13), note that by Lemma 8
S2η(X,Y |E) ≥ S2η(XΠsimΠDE, YΠsimΠDE|U,Πsim,ΠDE, E)
≥ S2η(XYˆ , XˆY |U,Πsim,ΠDE, E). (16)
Next, note that by (10) the transcript ΠsimΠDE takes no more than 2|pisim|+h(XΠ4YΠ)+∆2+ξ values for
every realization (X,Y ) /∈ E3. However, when the event E = Eij holds, h (XΠ4YΠ) ≤ λ(3)min + j∆3. It
follows by Lemma 10 that
S2η(XYˆ , XˆY |UΠsimΠDE, E)
≥ Sη(XYˆ , XˆY |U, E)− |pisim| − λ(3)min − j∆3 −∆2 − ξ − 2 log(1/2η). (17)
Also, since {X = Xˆ, Y = Yˆ } holds when we condition on E ,
Sη(XYˆ , XˆY |U, E) = Sη(XY,XY |U, E)
≥ Hmin(PXY U |E | U)− 2 log(1/2η), (18)
where the previous inequality is by the leftover hash lemma. Furthermore, by using
PXY U |E(x, y, u) ≤
PXY U (x, y, u)
Pr (E) ≤
PXY U (x, y, u)
α
we can bound Hmin(PXY U |E | U) as follows:
Hmin(PXY U |E | U) ≥ min
x,y,u
− log PXY U |E (x, y, u)
PU (u)
≥ min
x,y,u
− log PXY U (x, y, u)1(PXY U |E (x, y, u) > 0)
αPU (u)
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= min
x,y∈E(1)i
hPXY (x, y) + logα
≥ λ(1)min + (i− 1)∆1 + logα. (19)
Thus, on combining (16)-(19), we get
S2η(X,Y |E) ≥ [λ(1)min + (i− 1)∆1 − λ(3)min − j∆3 + logα]−∆2 − ξ − 4 log(1/2η)− |pisim|. (20)
To get a matching form of the upper bound (15) for S2η(X,Y |E), note that since16
−icPΠXY (τ ;x, y) = iPXY (x ∧ y)− hPXY (x, y) + hPΠXY ((x, τ)4− (y, τ)),
and since under E
hPXY (x, y) ≤ λ(1)min + i∆1,
hPXYΠ((x, τ)4(y, τ)) ≥ λ(3)min + (j − 1)∆3,
it holds that
Pr
(
{(x, y) : iPXY (x ∧ y) < γ + logα}
∣∣∣∣ E)
≥ Pr
({
(x, y, τ) : −icPXYΠ(x, y, τ) < γ − λ(1)min − i∆1 + λ(3)min + (j − 1)∆3 + logα
} ∣∣∣∣ E) .
On choosing
γ = −λ+ λ(1)min + i∆1 − λ(3)min − (j − 1)∆3 − logα,
it follows from (15) that
S2η(X,Y |E)
≤ −λ+ [λ(1)min + i∆1 − λ(3)min − (j − 1)∆3 − logα]− log (Pr (Eλ | E)− 3η)+ + 2 log(1/η)
≤ −λ+ [λ(1)min + i∆1 − λ(3)min − (j − 1)∆3 − logα]− log(1− 3η) + 2 log(1/η), (21)
where the equality holds since Pr (Eλ | E) = 1.
Thus, by (20) and (21), we get
|pisim| ≥ λ+ 2 logα−∆1 −∆2 −∆3 − ξ − 6 log(1/η) + log(1− 3η) + 4
16For clarity, we display the dependence of each information density on the underlying distribution in the remainder of this
section.
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= λ+ 2 log(Pr (Eλ)− ε− εtail − η)− 2 logN1N3 − (∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3)− logN2
− 7 log(1/η) + log(1− 3η) + 4.
where the equality holds for ξ = − log η+ logN2. Note that the maximum value of the right-side above,
when maximized over Ni and ∆i under the constraint Ni∆i = Λi, i = 1, 2, 3, occurs for ∆1 = ∆3 = 2
and ∆2 = 1. Substituting this choice of parameters, we get
|pisim| ≥ λ+ 2 log(Pr (Eλ)− ε− εtail − η)− 2 log Λ1Λ3 − log Λ2 − 7 log(1/η) + log(1− 3η) + 3.
≥ λ− 2 log Λ1Λ3 − log Λ2 − 9 log(1/η) + log(1− 3η) + 3.
where the final inequality holds for every λ such that Pr (Eλ) ≥ ε+ εtail + 2η; Theorem 1 follows upon
maximizing the right side-over all such λ. 
VI. SIMULATION PROTOCOL AND THE UPPER BOUND
In this section, we formally present an ε-simulation of a given interactive protocol pi with bounded
rounds. For clarity, we build the simulation protocol in steps.
A. Sending X using one-sided communication
We start with the well-known Slepian-Wolf compression problem [45] where Party 1 wants to transmit
X itself to Party 2 using as few bits as possible. This corresponds to simulating the deterministic protocol
Π = Π1 = X . See Remark 1 in Section II for a discussion on simulation of deterministic protocols.
For encoder, we use a hash function that is randomly chosen from a 2-universal hash family Fl(X );
for decoder, we use a kind of joint typical decoder [12]. Let the typical set TPX|Y be given by
TPX|Y =
{
(x, y) : hPX|Y (x|y) ≤ l − γ
}
(22)
for a slack parameter γ > 0. Our first protocol is given below:
The following result is from [34], [22, Lemma 7.2.1] (see, also, [30]).
Lemma 16 (Performance of Protocol 1). For every γ > 0, the protocol above satisfies
Pr
(
X 6= Xˆ
)
≤ PXY
(
T cPX|Y
)
+ 2−γ .
Essentially, the result above says that Party 1 can send X to Party 2 with probability of error less than
ε using roughly as many bits as the ε-tail of hPX|Y (X|Y ).
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Protocol 1: Slepian-Wolf compression
Input: Observations X and Y , uniform public randomness Uhash, and a parameter l
Output: Estimate Xˆ of X at party 2
Both parties use Uhash to select f from Fl(X )
Party 1 sends Πsim,1 = f(X)
if Party 2 finds a unique x ∈ TPX|Y with hash value f(x) = Πsim,1 then
set Xˆ = x
else
protocol declares an error
In fact, the use of the typical set in (22) is not crucial in Protocol 1 and its performance analysis: For a
given measure QXY , we can define another typical set TQX|Y by replacing hPX|Y (x|y) with hQX|Y (x|y)
in (22) even though the underlying distribution of (X,Y ) is PXY . Then, the error probability is bounded
as
Pr
(
X 6= Xˆ
)
≤ PXY
(
T cQX|Y
)
+ 2−γ ,
which implies that X can be sent by using roughly as many bits as the ε-tail of hQX|Y (X|Y ) under PXY .
This modification simplifies our performance analysis of the more involved protocols in the following
sections.
B. Sending X using interactive communication
Protocol 1 aims at minimizing the worst-case communication length over all realization of (X,Y ).
However, our goal here is to simulate a multiround interactive protocol, and we need not account for the
worst-case communication length in each round. Instead, we shall optimize the worst-case communication
length for the combined interactive protocol. The protocol below is a modification of Protocol 1 and uses
roughly h(X|Y ) bits for transmitting X instead of its ε-tail.
The new protocol proceeds as the previous one but relies on spectrum-slicing to adapt the length of
communication to the specific realization of (X,Y ): It increases the size of the hash output gradually,
starting with λ1 = λmin and increasing the size ∆-bits at a time until either Party 2 decodes X or λmax
bits have been sent. After each transmission, Party 2 sends either an ACK-NACK feedback signal. The
protocol stops when an ACK symbol is received.
Fix an auxiliary distribution QXY . For λminQX|Y , λ
max
QX|Y ,∆QX|Y > 0 with λ
max
QX|Y > λ
min
QX|Y , let
NQX|Y =
λmaxQX|Y − λminQX|Y
∆QX|Y
,
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and
λ
(i)
QX|Y
= λminQX|Y + (i− 1)∆QX|Y , 1 ≤ i ≤ NQX|Y .
Further, let
T (0)QX|Y :=
{
(x, y) | hQX|Y (x|y) ≥ λmaxQX|Y or hQX|Y (x|y) < λminQX|Y
}
, (23)
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ NQX|Y , let T (i)QX|Y denote the ith slice of the spectrum given by
T (i)QX|Y =
{
(x, y) | λ(i)QX|Y ≤ hQX|Y (x|y) < λ
(i)
QX|Y
+ ∆QX|Y
}
.
Note that T (0)QX|Y corresponds to T cQX|Y in the previous section and will be counted as an error event.
Protocol 2: Interactive Slepian-Wolf compression
Input: Observations X and Y with distribution PXY , uniform public randomness Uhash, auxiliary
distribution QXY , and parameters γ, λminQX|Y , ∆QX|Y , NQX|Y , and l
Output: Estimate Xˆ of X at party 2
Both parties use Uhash to select f1 from Fl(X )
Party 1 sends Πsim,1 = f1(X)
if Party 2 finds a unique x ∈ T (1)QX|Y with hash value f1(x) = Πsim,1 then
set Xˆ = x
send back Πsim,2 = ACK
else
send back Πsim,2 = NACK
while 2 ≤ i ≤ NQX|Y and party 2 did not send an ACK do
Both parties use Uhash to select fi from F∆QX|Y (X ), independent of f1, ..., fi−1
Party 1 sends Πsim,2i−1 = fi(X)
if Party 2 finds a unique x ∈ T (i)QX|Y with hash value fj(x) = Πsim,2j−1, ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ i then
set Xˆ = x
send back Πsim,2i = ACK
else
if More than one such x found then
protocol declares an error
else
send back Πsim,2i = NACK
Reset i→ i+ 1
if No Xˆ found at party 2 then
Protocol declares an error
Our protocol is described in Protocol 2. For every (x, y) ∈ T (i)QX|Y , 1 ≤ i ≤ NQX|Y , the following
lemma provides a bound on the error.
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Lemma 17 (Performance of Protocol 2). For (x, y) ∈ T (i)QX|Y , 1 ≤ i ≤ NQX|Y , denoting by Xˆ = Xˆ(x, y)
the estimate of x at Party 2 at the end of the protocol (with the convention that Xˆ = ∅ if an error is
declared), Protocol 2 sends at most (l + (i − 1)∆QX|Y + i) bits and has probability of error bounded
above as follows:
Pr
(
Xˆ 6= x | X = x, Y = y
)
≤ i2λminQX|Y +∆QX|Y −l.
Proof: Since (x, y) ∈ T (i)QX|Y , an error occurs if there exists a xˆ 6= x such that (xˆ, y) ∈ T
(j)
QX|Y
and
Πsim,2k−1 = f2k−1(xˆ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ j for some j ≤ i. Therefore, the probability of error is bounded
above as
Pr
(
Xˆ 6= x | X = x, Y = y
)
≤
i∑
j=1
∑
xˆ 6=x
Pr (f2k−1(x) = f2k−1(xˆ), ∀ 1 ≤ k ≤ j)1
(
(xˆ, y) ∈ T (j)QX|Y
)
≤
i∑
j=1
∑
xˆ 6=x
1
2l+(j−1)∆QX|Y
1
(
(xˆ, y) ∈ T (j)QX|Y
)
=
i∑
j=1
∑
xˆ 6=x
1
2l+(j−1)∆QX|Y
∣∣∣{xˆ | (xˆ, y) ∈ T (j)QX|Y }∣∣∣
≤ i2λminQX|Y +∆QX|Y −l,
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, the second inequality follows from the property
of 2-universal hash family, and the third inequality follows from the fact that
|{xˆ | (xˆ, y) ∈ T (j)QX|Y }| ≤ 2
λ
(j)
QX|Y +∆QX|Y .
Note that the protocol sends l bits in the first transmission, and ∆QX|Y bits and 1-bit feedback in every
subsequence transmission. Therefore, no more than (l + (i− 1)∆QX|Y + i) bits are sent.
Corollary 18. Protocol 2 with l = λminQX|Y +∆QX|Y +γ sends at most (hQX|Y (X|Y )+∆QX|Y +γ+NQX|Y )
bits when the observations are17 (X,Y ) /∈ T (0)QX|Y , and has probability of error less than
Pr
(
Xˆ 6= X
)
≤ Pr
(
(X,Y ) ∈ T (0)QX|Y
)
+NQX|Y 2
−γ .
C. Simulation of Π1 using interactive communication
We now proceed to simulating the first round of our given interactive protocol pi. Note that using
Protocol 2, we can send Π1 using roughly h(Π1|Y ) bits. This protocol uses a public randomness Uhash
17 When hQX|Y (X|Y ) < λminQX|Y , Protocol 2 may transmit more than (hQX|Y (X|Y ) + ∆QX|Y + γ +NQX|Y ) bits.
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only to choose hash functions, which is convenient for our probability of error analysis, and can be easily
derandomized. We now present a scheme which uses another independent portion of public randomness
Usim to reduce the rate of the communication further. However, the scheme will only allow the parties
to simulate Π1 (rather than recover it with small probability of error) and cannot be derandomized.
Specifically, our next protocol uses X and U = (Uhash, Usim) to simulate Π1 in such a manner that
Usim can be treated, in effect, as a portion of the communication used in Protocol 2. Note that since
Usim is independent of (X,Y ), the portion of communication which is equivalent to Usim must as well
be almost independent of (X,Y ). Such a portion can be guaranteed by noting that the communication
used in Protocol 2 is simply a random hash of Π1 drawn from a 2-universal family, and therefore, its
appropriately small portion can have the desired independence property by the leftover hash lemma. In
fact, since the Markov condition Π1−◦−X −◦−Y holds, it suffices guarantee the independent of X instead
of (X,Y ).
Protocol 3: Simulation of Π1
Input: Observations X and Y with distribution PXY , uniform public randomness
U = (Uhash, Usim), auxiliary distribution QΠ1Y , and parameters γ, λ
min
QΠ1|Y
, ∆QΠ1|Y , NQΠ1|Y
and k
Output: Estimates Π1X and Π1Y of Π1
1. Two parties share k random bits Usim and an h chosen from Hk(supp(Π1)) using Uhash
2. Party 1 generates a sample Π1X using PΠ1|Xf(Π1) (·|X,Usim)
3. Parties use Protocol 2 with auxiliary distribution QΠ1Y , and parameters γ, λminQΠ1|Y , ∆QΠ1|Y ,
NQΠ1|Y , and l = λ
min
QΠ1|Y
+ ∆QΠ1|Y + γ to send Π1X to Party 2 by treating Usim as the first k bits of
communication obtained via the hash function f
Our simulation protocol is described in Protocol 3. Let the quantities such as λminQΠ1|Y ,∆QΠ1|Y , and
NQΠ1|Y be defined analogously to the corresponding quantities in Section VI-B with Π1 replacing X .
The following lemma provides a bound on the simulation error for Protocol 3.
Lemma 19 (Performance of Protocol 3). Protocol 3 sends at most
(
hQΠ1|Y (Π1X |Y ) + ∆QΠ1|Y +NQΠ1|Y + γ − k
)
+
bits when (Π1X , Y ) /∈ T (0)QΠ1|Y , and has simulation error
dvar (PΠ1XΠ1YXY ,PΠ1Π1XY ) ≤ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)QΠ1|Y
)
+NQΠ1|Y 2
−γ +
1
2
√
2k−Hmin(PΠ1X |QX)
for any auxiliary distribution QX on X .
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Proof: Consider the following simple protocol for simulating Π1 at Party 2:
1) Party 1 generates a sample Π1 using PΠ1|X (·|X).
2) Both parties use Protocol 2 with auxiliary distribution QΠ1Y , and parameters γ, λ
min
QΠ1|Y
, ∆QΠ1|Y ,
NQΠ1|Y , and l = λ
min
QΠ1|Y
+ ∆QΠ1|Y + γ to generate an estimate Πˆ1 of Π1 at Party 2.
In this protocol, lwst = λminQΠ1|Y +NQΠ1|Y ∆QΠ1|Y +γ bits of hash values will be sent for the worst (Π1, Y ).
We divide these lwst hash values into two parts, the fist k bits and the last lwst − k bits; let f and f ′,
respectively, denote the hash function producing the first and the second parts. Protocol 3 replaces, in
effect, f with shared randomness Usim for an appropriately chosen value of k.
Note that the joint distribution of the random variables involved in the simple protocol above satisfies18
Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Πˆ1XY (v, v
′, τ, τˆ , x, y)
= Pf(Π1)X(v, x)PΠ1|Xf(Π1)(τ |x, v)Pf ′(Π1)|Π1(v′|τ)PY |X(y|x)PΠˆ1|f(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1XY (τˆ |v, v′, τ, x, y).
(24)
Note that the simple protocol above is deterministic and therefore by Remark 1
dvar
(
Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Πˆ1XY ,Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Π1XY
)
= Pr
(
Π1 6= Πˆ1
)
≤ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)QΠ1|Y
)
+NQΠ1|Y 2
−γ , (25)
where the inequality is by Corollary 18.
On the other hand, the joint distribution of random variables involved in Protocol 3 can be factorized
as
PUsimf ′(Π1X )Π1XΠ1YXY (u, u
′, τ, τˆ , x, y)
= PUsim(u)PX(x)PΠ1|Xf(Π1)(τ |x, u)Pf ′(Π1)|Π1(u′|τ)PY |X(y|x)PΠˆ1|f(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1XY (τˆ |u, u′, τ, x, y).
(26)
Therefore, the simulation error for Protocol 3 is bounded as
dvar (PΠ1XΠ1YXY ,PΠ1Π1XY )
≤ dvar
(
PUsimf ′(Π1)Π1XΠ1YXY ,Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Π1XY
)
≤ dvar
(
PUsimf ′(Π1)Π1XΠ1YXY ,Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Πˆ1XY
)
+ dvar
(
Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Πˆ1XY ,Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Π1XY
)
= dvar
(
PUsimPX ,Pf(Π1)X
)
+ dvar
(
Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Πˆ1XY ,Pf(Π1)f ′(Π1)Π1Π1XY
)
18When the protocol terminate before NQΠ1|Y th round, a part of (f(Π1), f
′(Π1)) may not be sent.
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≤ dvar
(
PUsimPX ,Pf(Π1)X
)
+ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)QΠ1|Y
)
+NQΠ1|Y 2
−γ ,
where the first inequality is by the monotonicity of dvar (·, ·), the second inequality is by the triangular
inequality, the equality is by the fact that replacing PUsimPX with Pf(Π1)X is the only difference between
the factorizations in (26) and (24), and the final inequality is by (25). The desired bound on simulation
error for Protocol 3 follows by using Lemma 9 to get
dvar
(
PUsimPX ,Pf(Π1)X
) ≤ 1
2
√
2k−Hmin(PΠ1X |QX).
Since Protocol 3 uses shared randomness Usim instead of sending f(Π1), it communicates k fewer bits
in comparison with the simple protocol above, which completes the proof.
D. Improved simulation of Π1
In Protocol 3 we were able to reduce the communication by roughly Hmin(PΠ1X |QX) bits by simulating
a Π1 such that if we use Protocol 2 for sending Π1 to Party 2, a portion of the required communication
can be treated as shared public randomness. However, this is the least reduction in communication we can
obtain in the worst-case. In this section, we slice the spectrum of hPΠ1|X (Π1|X) to obtain an instantaneous
reduction of roughly hPΠ1|X (Π1|X) bits.
Denote by J a random variable which takes the value j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NPΠ1|X} if (Π1, X) ∈ T
(j)
PΠ1|X
. In
our modified protocol, Party 1 first samples J and sends it to Party 2. Then, they proceed with Protocol 3
for PΠ1XY |J=j by selecting k to be less than Hmin(PΠ1X|J=j |QX) for an appropriately chosen QX . Let
Jg be the set of ”good” indices j > 0 with
PJ (j) ≥ 1
N2PΠ1|X
;
it holds that
PJ
(J cg ) < Pr((Π1, X) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|X)+ 1NPΠ1|X .
Note that for j ∈ Jg, with QX = PX , we have
Hmin(PΠ1X|J=j |PX) = minτ,x − log
PΠ1X|J (τ, x|j)
PX (x)
= min
τ,x
− log PΠ1|X (τ |x)
PJ (j)
≥ λminPΠ1|X + (j − 1)∆PΠ1|X − 2 logNPΠ1|X .
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Protocol 4: Improved simulation of Π1
Input: Observations X and Y with distribution PXY , uniform public randomness
U = (Uhash, Usim), and parameters λminPΠ1|Y , ∆PΠ1|Y , NPΠ1|Y , λ
min
PΠ1|X
, ∆PΠ1|X , NPΠ1|X , and γ
Output: Estimates Π1X and Π1Y of Π1
Party 1 generate J ∼ PJ |X(·|X), and send it to Party 2.
if J = j ∈ Jg then
Parties use Protocol 3 with auxiliary distribution PΠ1Y , parameters γ, λ
min
PΠ1|Y
, ∆PΠ1|Y , NPΠ1|Y ,
and k = λminPΠ1|X + (j − 1)∆PΠ1|X − 2 logNPΠ1|X − 2γ + 2 to simulate Π1X and Π1Y for the
distribution PΠ1XY |J=j
else
protocol declares an error
Our modified simulation protocol is described in Protocol 4. The following lemma provides a bound
on the simulation error.
Lemma 20 (Performance of Protocol 4). Protocol 4 sends at most
(
hPΠ1|Y (Π1X |Y )− hPΠ1|X (Π1X |X) +NPΠ1|Y + 3 logNPΠ1|X + ∆PΠ1|Y + ∆PΠ1|X + 3γ
)
+
bits when (Π1X , Y ) /∈ T (0)PΠ1|Y , and has simulation error
dvar (PΠ1XΠ1YXY ,PΠ1Π1XY )
≤ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|Y
)
+ Pr
(
(Π1, X) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|X
)
+
(
NPΠ1|Y + 1
)
2−γ +
1
NPΠ1|X
.
Proof: First, we have
dvar (PΠ1XΠ1YXY ,PΠ1Π1XY )
≤ dvar (PΠ1XΠ1YXY J ,PΠ1Π1XY J)
=
∑
j
PJ(j)dvar
(
PΠ1XΠ1YXY |J=j ,PΠ1Π1XY |J=j
)
≤
∑
j∈Jg
PJ(j)dvar
(
PΠ1XΠ1YXY |J=j ,PΠ1Π1XY |J=j
)
+ PJ
(J cg )
≤
∑
j∈Jg
PJ(j)dvar
(
PΠ1XΠ1YXY |J=j ,PΠ1Π1XY |J=j
)
+ Pr
(
(Π1, X) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|X
)
+
1
NPΠ1|X
.
Then, we apply Lemma 19 with QX = PX for each j ∈ Jg, and get
dvar
(
PΠ1XΠ1YXY |J=j ,PΠ1Π1XY |J=j
)
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≤ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|Y | J = j
)
+NPΠ1|Y 2
−γ +
1
2
√
2k−Hmin(PΠ1X|J=j |PX)
≤ Pr
(
(Π1, Y ) ∈ T (0)PΠ1|Y | J = j
)
+
(
NPΠ1|Y + 1
)
2−γ . (27)
Thus, we have the desired bound on simulation error.
Next, we prove the claimed bound on the number of bits sent by the protocol. By Lemma 19, the fact
that J can be sent by using at most logNPΠ1|X + 1 bits and the choice of k in Protocol 4, for J = j the
protocol above communicates at most
hQΠ1|Y (Π1X |Y ) + ∆QΠ1|Y +NQΠ1|Y + γ + logNPΠ1|X + 2− k
≤ hQΠ1|Y (Π1X |Y )− λminPΠ1|X − (j − 1)∆PΠ1|X + ∆QΠ1|Y +NQΠ1|Y + 3 logNPΠ1|X + 3γ.
≤ hQΠ1|Y (Π1X |Y )− hPΠ1|X (Π1X |X) + ∆PΠ1|X + ∆QΠ1|Y +NQΠ1|Y + 3 logNPΠ1|X + 3γ,
where the previous inequality holds since for Π1X generated by PΠ1|Xf(Π1)J(·|X,Usim, j)
λminPΠ1|X + j∆PΠ1|X ≥ hPΠ1|X (Π1X |X),
for each j ∈ Jg.
E. Simulation of Π
We are now in a position to describe our complete simulation protocol. Consider an interactive protocol
pi with maximum number of rounds rmax = d < ∞. We simply apply Protocol 4 for each round Πt of
Π. Our overall simulation protocol is described in Protocol 5. In each round we use Protocol 4 assuming
that the simulation up to the previous round has succeeded, where, for the rounds with even numbers,
we use Protocol 4 by interchanging the role of Party 1 and Party 2.
Protocol 5: Simulation of Π
Input: Observations X and Y with distribution PXY , uniform public randomness
U = (Ut,hash, Ut,sim : t = 1, . . . , d), and parameters λminPΠt|XΠt−1
, ∆PΠt|XΠt−1 , NPΠt|XΠt−1 ,
λminPΠt|YΠt−1
, ∆PΠt|YΠt−1 , NPΠt|YΠt−1 for t = 1, . . . , d and γ.
Output: Estimates ΠX and ΠY of Π
while Total communication is less than lmax bits, and simulation not ended do
Party 1 and Party 2, respectively, use estimates Πt−1X and Π
t−1
Y for Π
t−1 ;
Parties use Protocol 4 for simulating PΠt(XΠt−1)(YΠt−1) with parameters λ
min
PΠt|XΠt−1
, ∆PΠt|XΠt−1 ,
NPΠt|XΠt−1 , λ
min
PΠt|YΠt−1
, ∆PΠt|YΠt−1 , NPΠt|YΠt−1 and γ ;
Update t→ t+ 1
if Total communication exceeds lmax bits then
Declare an error
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The following lemma provides a bound on the simulation error.
Lemma 21 (Performance of Protocol 5). Protocol 5 sends at most lmax bits, and has simulation error
dvar (PΠXΠYXY ,PΠΠXY )
≤ Pr
(
ic(Π;X,Y ) +
d∑
t=1
δt > lmax
)
+
d∑
t=1
[
4Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ 4Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)
+ 3
(
NPΠt|YΠt−1 +NPΠt|XΠt−1 + 2
)
2−γ +
3
NPΠt|XΠt−1
+
3
NPΠt|YΠt−1
]
,
where
δt =
 NPΠt|YΠt−1 + 3 logNPΠt|XΠt−1 + ∆PΠt|YΠt−1 + ∆PΠt|XΠt−1 + 3γ odd tNPΠt|XΠt−1 + 3 logNPΠt|YΠt−1 + ∆PΠt|XΠt−1 + ∆PΠt|YΠt−1 + 3γ even t . (28)
Remark 5. The fudge parameters ε′ and λ′ are given by
ε′ =
d∑
t=1
[
4Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ 4Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)
+ 3
(
NPΠt|YΠt−1 +NPΠt|XΠt−1 + 2
)
2−γ +
3
NPΠt|XΠt−1
+
3
NPΠt|YΠt−1
]
,
λ′ =
d∑
t=1
δt,
where δt is given by (28).
Proof: Consider a virtual protocol which does not terminate even if the total number of bits exceed
lmax. Denote the output of this protocol by Π¯X = (Π¯1X , . . . , Π¯dX ) and Π¯Y = (Π¯1Y , . . . , Π¯dY). We have
dvar (PΠXΠYXY ,PΠΠXY )
≤ dvar
(
PΠXΠYXY ,PΠ¯X Π¯YXY
)
+ dvar
(
PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY
)
≤ Pr ((ΠX ,ΠY) 6= (Π¯X , Π¯Y))+ dvar (PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY ) . (29)
First, we bound the second term of (29). By using triangular inequality repeatedly and by using Lemma
20, we have
dvar
(
PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY
)
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≤ dvar
(
PΠ¯1X Π¯1Y ···Π¯(d−1)X Π¯(d−1)YΠ¯dX Π¯dYXY ,PΠ1Π1···Π(d−1)Π(d−1)Π¯dX Π¯dYXY
)
+ dvar
(
PΠ1Π1···Π(d−1)Π(d−1)Π¯dX Π¯dYXY ,PΠ1Π1···Π(d−1)Π(d−1)ΠdΠdXY
)
= dvar
(
PΠ¯1X Π¯1Y ···Π¯(d−1)X Π¯(d−1)YXY ,PΠ1Π1···Π(d−1)Π(d−1)XY
)
+ dvar
(
PΠ¯dX Π¯dY(XΠd−1)(YΠd−1),PΠdΠd(XΠd−1)(YΠd−1)
)
=
...
=
d∑
t=1
dvar
(
PΠ¯tX Π¯tY(XΠt−1)(YΠt−1),PΠtΠt(XΠt−1)(YΠt−1)
)
≤
∑
t:odd
[
Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)]
+
(
NPΠt|YΠt−1 + 1
)
2−γ +
1
NPΠt|XΠt−1
]
+
∑
t:even
[
Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)]
+
(
NPΠt|XΠt−1 + 1
)
2−γ +
1
NPΠt|YΠt−1
]
≤
d∑
t=1
[
Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)
+
(
NPΠt|YΠt−1 +NPΠt|XΠt−1 + 2
)
2−γ +
1
NPΠt|XΠt−1
+
1
NPΠt|YΠt−1
]
. (30)
Denote
l(X,Y, Π¯X , Π¯Y) :=
∑
t:odd
hPΠt|YΠt−1 (Π¯tX |Y, Π¯
t−1
Y )− hPΠt|XΠt−1 (Π¯tX |X, Π¯
t−1
X )
+
∑
t:even
hPΠt|XΠt−1 (Π¯tY |X, Π¯
t−1
X )− hPΠt|YΠt−1 (Π¯tY |Y, Π¯
t−1
Y ).
Since (ΠX ,ΠY) coincides with (Π¯X , Π¯Y) when the accumulated message length of the protocol generat-
ing (Π¯X , Π¯Y) does not exceed lmax, and since the message length of each round is bounded by each term
of l(X,Y, Π¯X , Π¯Y) plus δt by Lemma 20 unless (Π¯tX , (Y, Π¯t−1Y )) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1 or (Π¯tY , (X, Π¯
t−1
X )) ∈
T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1 , we have
Pr
(
(ΠX ,ΠY) 6= (Π¯X , Π¯Y)
)
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≤ Pr
(
l(X,Y, Π¯X , Π¯Y) +
d∑
t=1
δt > lmax
)
+ Pr
(⋃
t:odd
(Π¯tX , (Y, Π¯t−1Y )) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1 or
⋃
t:even
(Π¯tY , (X, Π¯t−1X )) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)
(31)
Since
Pr
(
(X,Y, Π¯X , Π¯Y) ∈ E
) ≤ Pr ((X,Y,Π,Π) ∈ E) + dvar (PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY )
for any event E , it follows from (31) that
Pr
(
(ΠX ,ΠY) 6= (Π¯X , Π¯Y)
)
≤ Pr
(
l(X,Y,Π,Π) +
d∑
t=1
δt > lmax
)
+ Pr
(⋃
t:odd
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1 or
⋃
t:even
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)
+ 2dvar
(
PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY
)
≤ Pr
(
l(X,Y,Π,Π) +
d∑
t=1
δt > lmax
)
+
d∑
t=1
[
Pr
(
(Πt, (Y,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|YΠt−1
)
+ Pr
(
(Πt, (X,Π
t−1)) ∈ T (0)PΠt|XΠt−1
)]
+ 2dvar
(
PΠ¯X Π¯YXY ,PΠΠXY
)
.
(32)
Thus, by combining this bound with (29) and (30), and by noting
l(X,Y,Π,Π) = ic(Π;X,Y ),
we have the desired bound on simulation error.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY
We now present the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 7. Both the proofs rely on carefully choosing
the slice-sizes in the lower and upper bounds.
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A. Proof of Theorem 3
We start with the upper bound. Note that, for IID random variables (Πn, Xn, Y n), the spectrums of
h(Πnt |Zn, (Πt−1)n) for19 Z = X or Y have width O(
√
n). Therefore, the parameters ∆s and Ns that
appear in the fudge parameters can be chosen as O(n1/4). Specifically, by standard measure concentration
bounds (for bounded random variables), for every ν > 0, there exists a constant20 c > 0 such that with
λminPΠnt |Zn(Πt−1)n
= nH(Πt|Z,Πt−1)− c
√
n,
λmaxPΠnt |Zn(Πt−1)n
= nH(Πt|Z,Πt−1) + c
√
n,
the following bound holds:
Pr
(
(Πnt , (Z
n, (Πt−1)n)) ∈ T (0)PΠnt |Zn(Πt−1)n
)
≤ ν. (33)
Let T denote the third central moment of the random variable ic(Π;X,Y ). For
λn = nIC(pi) +
√
nV(pi)Q−1
(
ε− 9dν − T
3
2V(pi)3/2
√
n
)
,
choosing ∆PΠnt |Zn(Πt−1)n = NPΠnt |Zn(Πt−1)n = γ =
√
2cn1/4, and lmax = λn +
∑d
t=1 δt in Theorem 2 (for
the definition of the fudge parameters, see Remark 5), we get a protocol of length lmax and satisfying
dvar
(
PΠnXΠnYXnY n ,PΠnΠnXnY n
) ≤ Pr( n∑
i=1
ic(Πi;Xi, Yi) > λn
)
+ 9dν
for sufficiently large n. By its definition given in (28), δt = O(n1/4) for the choice of parameters above.
Thus, the Berry-Esse´en theorem (cf. [18]) and the observation above gives a protocol of length lmax
attaining ε-simulation. Therefore, using the Taylor approximation of Q(·) yields the achievability of the
claimed protocol length.
For the lower bound, we fix sufficiently small constant δ > 0, and we set λ(1)min = n(H(X,Y ) − δ),
λ
(1)
max = n(H(X,Y )+δ), λ
(2)
min = n(H(X|Y,Π)−δ), λ(2)max = n(H(X|Y,Π)+δ), λ(3)min = n(H(XΠ4YΠ)−
δ), λ(3)max = n(H(XΠ4YΠ) + δ), respectively. Then, by standard measure concentration bounds imply
that the tail probability εtail in (3) is bounded above by cn for some constant c > 0. We also set η =
1
n .
19We use this notation throughout this section to avoid repetition.
20Although the constant depends on random variables appearing in each round, since the number of rounds is bounded, we
take the maximum constant so that (33) holds for every t.
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For these choices of parameters, we note that the fudge parameter is λ′ = O(log n). Thus, by setting
λ = λn = nIC(pi) +
√
nV(pi)Q−1
(
ε+
c+ 2
n
+
T 3
2V(pi)3/2
√
n
)
= nIC(pi) +
√
nV(pi)Q−1(ε) +O(log n),
where the final equality is by the Tailor approximation, an application of the Berry-Esse´en theorem to
the bound in (2) gives the desired lower bound on the protocol length. 
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 1 implies that if a protocol pisim is such that
log |pisim| < λ− λ′, (34)
then its simulation error must be larger than
Pr (ic (Πn;Xn, Y n) > λ)− ε′. (35)
To compute fudge parameters, we set λ(1)min = n(H(X,Y ) − δ), λ(1)max = n(H(X,Y ) + δ), λ(2)min =
n(H(X|Y,Π)−δ), λ(2)max = n(H(X|Y,Π)+δ), λ(3)min = n(H(XΠ4YΠ)−δ), λ(3)max = n(H(XΠ4YΠ)+
δ), respectively. By the Chernoff bound, there exists E1 > 0 such that
εtail ≤ 2−E1n.
Furthermore, Λi = O(n) for i = 1, 2, 3. We set η = 2−
δ
27
n. It follows that
ε′ ≤ 2−E1n + 2− δ27n (36)
and
λ′ ≤ δ
3
n+O(log n). (37)
Finally, upon setting
λ = nIC(pi)− δ
3
(38)
and applying the Chernoff bound once more, we obtain a constant E2 > 0 such that
Pr (ic (Πn;Xn, Y n) > λ) ≥ 1− 2−E2n. (39)
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The result follows upon combining (34)-(39). 
C. Proof of Theorem 7
For a sequence of protocols pi = {pin}∞n=1 and a sequence of observations (X,Y) = {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=1,
let
H(Πt|Z,Πt−1) = sup
{
α : lim
n→∞Pr
(
h(Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n ) < α
)
= 0
}
, (40)
H(Πt|Z,Πt−1) = inf
{
α : lim
n→∞Pr
(
h(Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n ) > α
)
= 0
}
, (41)
where Z = X or Y, Πt = {Πn,t}∞n=1 and Πt−1n = {Πt−1n }∞n=1 are sequences of transcripts of tth round
and up to tth rounds, respectively. For achievability part, we fix arbitrary small δ > 0, and set
λminP
Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n
= n
(
H(Πt|Z,Πt−1)− δ
)
,
λmaxP
Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n
= n
(
H(Πt|Z,Πt−1) + δ
)
,
∆P
Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n
= NP
Πn,t|ZnΠt−1n
= γ =
√
2δn. We set
lmax = n
(
IC(pi) + δ
)
+
d∑
t=1
δt
= n
(
IC(pi) + δ
)
+O(
√
n),
where δt is given by (28). Then, by Theorem 2, by the definition of IC(pi) and by (40) and (41), there
exists a simulation protocol of length lmax with vanishing simulation error. Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we
have the desired achievability bound.
For converse part, we fix arbitrary δ > 0, and set λ(1)min = n(H(X,Y)− δ), λ(1)max = n(H(X,Y) + δ),
λ
(2)
min = n(H(X|Y,Π) − δ), λ(2)max = n(H(X|Y,Π) + δ), λ(3)min = n(H(XΠ4YΠ) − δ), λ(3)max =
n(H(XΠ4YΠ) + δ), respectively, where
H(X,Y) = sup
{
α : lim
n→∞Pr (h(XnYn) < α) = 0
}
,
H(X,Y) = inf
{
α : lim
n→∞Pr (h(XnYn) > α) = 0
}
,
H(X|Y,Π) = sup {α : Pr (h(Xn|YnΠn) < α) = 0} ,
H(X|Y,Π) = inf {α : Pr (h(Xn|YnΠn) > α) = 0} ,
H(XΠ4YΠ) = sup {α : Pr (−h(XnΠn4YnΠn) < α) = 0} ,
H(XΠ4YΠ) = inf {α : Pr (−h(XnΠn4YnΠn) > α) = 0} .
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Then, by the definitions, we find that the tail probability εtail in (3) converges to 0. We also set η = (1/n).
For these choices of parameters, we note that the fudge parameter is λ′ = O(log n). Thus, by using the
bound in (2) for
λ = λn = n
(
IC(pi) + δ
)
, (42)
and by taking δ → 0, we have the desired converse bound. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a common randomness decomposition based approach (cf. [48]) to derive a lower
bound on communication complexity of protocol simulation by relating the protocol simulation problem
to the secret key agreement. A key step in our approach is identifying the amount of common randomness
generated through protocol simulation. Our estimate for the amount of common randomness does not
rely on the structure of the function to be computed. This is contrast to most of the existing lower bounds
on communication complexity for function computation, such as the partition bound or the discrepancy
bound, where the structure of the computed function plays an important role. In particular, a comparison
of our approach with other existing approaches for specific functions is not available. An important future
research agenda for us is to incorporate the structure of functions in our bound; the case of functions
with a small range such as Boolean functions is of particular interest.
APPENDIX
To illustrate the utility of our lower bound, we consider a protocol pi which takes very few values most
of the time, but with very small probability it can send many different transcripts. The proposed protocol
can be ε-simulated using very few bits of communication on average. But in the worst-case it requires as
many bits of communication for ε-simulation as needed for data exchange, for all ε > 0 small enough.
Specifically, let X = Y = {1, . . . , 2n} and let pi be a deterministic protocol such that the transcript
τ(x, y) for (x, y) is given by
τ(x, y) =

a if x > δ2n, y > δ2n
b if x > δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
c if x ≤ δ2n, y > δ2n
(x, y) if x ≤ δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
for some small δ > 0, which will be specified later. Clearly, this protocol is interactive.
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Let (X,Y ) be the uniform random variables on X × Y . Then,
Pr (Π /∈ {a, b, c}) = δ2.
Since
PΠ|X(τ(x, y)|x) =

1− δ if x > δ2n, y > δ2n
δ if x > δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
1− δ if x ≤ δ2n, y > δ2n
1
2n if x ≤ δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
and similarly for PΠ|Y (τ(x, y)|y), we have
ic(τ(x, y);x, y) =

2 log(1/(1− δ)) if x > δ2n, y > δ2n
log(1/δ) + log(1/(1− δ)) if x > δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
log(1/δ) + log(1/(1− δ)) if x ≤ δ2n, y > δ2n
2n if x ≤ δ2n, y ≤ δ2n
.
Consider δ = 1n , and ε =
1
n3 . Note that for any λ < 2n,
Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) ≥ Pr (Π{a, b, c}) = δ2 = 1
n2
> ε,
and
Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > 2n) = 0.
Thus, the ε-tail of information complexity density λε = sup{λ : Pr (ic(Π;X,Y ) > λ) > ε} is given by
λε = 2n. (43)
On the other hand, we have
IC(pi) = H(Π|X) +H(Π|Y )
≤ 2δ[hb(δ) + log n− log(1/δ)] + 2(1− δ)hb(δ)
≤ O˜(δ2)
where hb(·) is the binary entropy function.
Also, to evaluate the lower bound of Theorem 1, we bound the fudge parameters in that bound. To that
end, we fix εtail = 0 and bound the spectrum lengths Λ1,Λ2,Λ3. Since (X,Y ) is uniform, h(X,Y ) = 2n
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and so, Λ1 = 0. Also, note that with probability 1 the conditional entropy density h(X|Π, Y ) is either 0
or log(δ2n), which implies Λ2 = O(n). A similar argument shows that Λ3 = O(n). Therefore, the fudge
parameter
λ′ = O(log Λ1Λ2Λ3) = O(log n),
which in view of (43) and Theorem 1 gives Dε (pi) = Ω(2n). 
Lemma. Consider random variables X,Y, Z and V taking values in countable sets X , Y , Z , and a
finite set V , respectively. Then, for every 0 < ε < 1/2,
S2ε(X,Y |ZV ) ≥ Sε(X,Y |Z)− log |V| − 2 log(1/2ε).
Proof. Consider random variables K ′X and K
′
Y with a common range K′ such that (K ′X ,K ′Y) constitutes
an ε-secret key for X and Y given eavesdropper’s observation Z, recoverable using an interactive protocol
pi′. Let QK′XK′YΠ′ZV denote the distribution P
′(2)
unifPΠ′ZV , where P
′(2)
unif denotes the distribution
P
′(2)
unif(kX , kY) =
1(kX = kY)
|K′| , ∀ kY , kY ∈ K
′.
Then, by definition of an ε-secret key, it holds that
dvar
(
PK′XK′YΠ′Z ,QK′XK′YΠ′Z
) ≤ ε. (44)
Note that Hmin(QK′XΠ′Z | Π′Z) ≥ log |K′|. Therefore, by Lemma 9 there exists a function KX = K(K ′X )
taking values in a set K with log |K| ≥ log |K′| − log |V| − 2 log(1/2ε) such that
dvar (QKXΠ′ZV ,PunifQΠ′ZV ) ≤ ε, (45)
where Punif denotes the uniform distribution on the set K. Upon letting KY = K(K ′Y) and defining
P
(2)
unif analogously to P
′(2)
unif with K in place of K′, we have
dvar
(
PKXKYΠ′ZV ,P
(2)
unifPΠ′ZV
)
≤ dvar
(
QKXKYΠ′ZV ,P
(2)
unifPΠ′ZV
)
+ ε
= dvar (QKΠ′ZV ,PunifPΠ′ZV ) + ε
≤ 2ε,
where the first inequality is by (44) and the second by (45), and the equality is by the definition of Q.
Therefore, (KX ,KY) constitutes a 2ε-secret key of length log |K′| − log |V| − 2 log(1/2ε) for X and Y
given eavesdropper’s observation (Z, V ). The claimed bound follows since K ′ was an arbitrary secret
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key for X and Y given eavesdropper’s observation Z. 
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